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Although interactive technologies are usually developed with certain pur-
poses of use in mind, their users often adapt them for their own needs.
This adaptation process that changes the ways in which the technologies
are used is called appropriation. Appropriation is both a social and a cogni-
tive process. The social aspects of appropriation have been actively studied
in existing research, focusing on the changes of shared practices of use, the
ways in which new uses are learned together or from each other, and on the
key individuals who invent and propagate new uses. In contrast to this, the
cognitive aspects have remained on the margin as a less studied subject.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a theory for individual users’
repurposive appropriations that refer to changes specifically in technologies’
purposes of use, as opposed to other changes, such as increased efficiency of
use or deepening emotional identification. In repurposive appropriation, a
user discovers a novel purpose of use for a technology, ‘novel’ meaning that
this purpose was not known by the user at an earlier point of time. The spe-
cific focus in this thesis is on individual users’ discoveries of workarounds:
appropriations in which a previously unconsidered technology is used in
place of another one that has been applied previously.
This thesis follows an exploratory research approach. Its theoretical ba-
sis is in cognitive science, particularly in theories of distributed cognition,
problem-solving, and creativity. The empirical basis comes from four stud-
ies on systems: three open-ended field experiments on mobile multimedia
messaging systems (mGroup, CoMedia, and Comeks) and a web survey on
appropriations of digital cameras. These studies shared the same techno-
logical domain (piecewise visual content creation and everyday use outside
of the institutional context) and addressed only appropriations that did
not require reprogramming or other expert adaptation skills. This was the
scope also in this thesis.
An analysis of appropriations across the four studies suggests that users
appropriate by mapping together situational (i.e., technological, social and
physical) features of the context. Drawing from theories in cognitive sci-
ence, three mapping-based cognitive processes are suggested to explain dis-
coveries of workaround-like appropriations. They share a hypothesis that
with mapping, users create mental representations called solution schemas
about novel ways of using technologies.
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Users may make mappings by recognizing environmental structures that
provide partial solutions to their ongoing or past problems with novel tech-
nologies. Alternatively, users may re-represent their present problems on a
more generalized level, which enables problems’ mapping to analogical so-
lutions schemas. These schemas may point to different technologies than in
the original unsuccessful solution schema. As a third alternative, users may
find analogies between two technologies that can be used in the same stage
in the problem-solving path. This involves a mapping between a famil-
iar but unavailable technology and a present but previously unconsidered
technology. Users’ existing, especially breadth-oriented technology-related
knowledge is suggested to act as an important underlying enabler in all of
these three mappings.
The findings provide several design implications for human–computer
interaction and research implications for cognitive science.
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Tiivistelmä
Vaikka vuorovaikutteiset teknologiat yleensä kehitetään ennalta mietittyi-
hin käyttötarkoituksiin, käyttäjät usein muokkaavat niitä omiin tarpeisiin-
sa sopiviksi. Tätä käyttötapoja muuttavaa muokkaamisprosessia kutsutaan
appropriaatioksi. Appropriaatio on sekä sosiaalinen että kognitiivinen pro-
sessi. Sen sosiaalisia piirteitä on tutkittu aktiivisesti, keskittyen teknologian
käytön jaettujen käytäntöjen muuttumiseen, uusien käyttötapojen oppimi-
seen yhdessä tai muiden opastuksella, ja uusia käyttötapoja keksiviin ja
levittäviin avainyksilöihin. Sitä vastoin kognitiivisia piirteitä on tutkittu
huomattavasti vähemmän.
Tämän väitöskirjan tarkoitus on kehittää käyttäjiin yksilöinä keskit-
tyvä teoria erityisesti uusia käyttötarkoituksia luovista appropriaatioista
(repurposive appropriations). Nämä appropriaatiot poikkeavat muista tek-
nologian käytön muutoksista, kuten tehokkaammaksi käyttäjäksi kehit-
tymisestä tai syvenevästä emotionaalisesta suhteesta teknologiaan omas-
sa elämässä. Uusia käyttötarkoituksia luovissa appropriaatioissa ‘uutuus’
tarkoittaa, että käyttäjä keksii sellaisen käyttötarkoituksen, joka on ollut
hänelle aiemmin tuntematon. Tässä väitöskirjassa keskitytään yksilötasolla
erityisesti käyttäjien keksimiin kiertotapoihin (workarounds): appropri-
aatioihin, joissa aiemmin kyseiseen tarkoitukseen liittymättömänä pidet-
tyä teknologiaa käytetään sellaisen teknologian tilalla, jota aiemmin on
käytetty vastaavissa tilanteissa.
Tämä väitöskirja on tutkimusotteeltaan eksploratiivinen. Teorioiltaan
se pohjautuu kognitiotieteeseen, erityisesti hajautetun kognition, ongel-
manratkaisun ja luovuuden tutkimukseen. Empiirisenä pohjana on neljä
teknologiatutkimusta: kolme avointa kenttätutkimusta langattomista mul-
timediaviestintäjärjestelmistä (mGroup, CoMedia ja Comeks) sekä www-
pohjainen kysely digitaalikameroiden appropriaatioista. Näitä tutkimuksia
yhdisti yhteinen teknologinen perusta (pieninä kokonaisuuksina tuotettu vi-
suaalinen sisältö sekä arkikäyttö institutionaalisen kontekstin ulkopuolella).
Ne myös käsittelivät vain appropriaatioita, jotka eivät edellytä ohjelmoin-
titaitoa tai muuta teknologian muokkaamiseen liittyvää asiantuntijuutta.
Tämän väitöskirjan rajaus on samanlainen.
Väitöskirja ehdottaa, että yksilöiden approprioinnin pohjalla on tilanne-
kohtaisten (teknologisten, sosiaalisten ja fyysisten) tekijöiden yhteen kytke-
minen (mapping). Kognitiotieteen teorioihin nojaten esitetään kolme kyt-
kemispohjaista kognitiivista prosessia, joilla voidaan selittää kiertotapo-
7
jen kaltaisia appropriaatioita. Yhteisenä hypoteesina on, että kytkemisessä
käyttäjät luovat ratkaisumalleiksi (solution schema) kutsuttuja tietoesityk-
siä uusista käyttötavoista.
Kytkemiset voivat perustua sellaisten ympäristön rakenteiden tunnis-
tamiseen, jotka tarjoavat osittaisia ratkaisumalleja aiemmin kohdattuihin
tai käsillä oleviin teknologiaan liittyviin ongelmiin. Toinen vaihtoehto on,
että käyttäjät käsitteellistävät ongelman uudella yleisemmällä tavalla, mikä
mahdollistaa uusien kytkemisten keksimisen analogioihin perustuen. Kol-
mas kytkemistapa liittyy kahden teknologian välisen analogian havaitsemi-
seen. Havainto voi auttaa käyttäjää keksimään keinon korvata ensisijainen
(mutta sillä hetkellä puuttuva) teknologia toisella tarjolla olevalla (mutta
aiemmin epäolennaisena pidetyllä) teknologialla ilman, että muu ongelman-
ratkaisuprosessi olennaisesti muuttuu. Väitöskirja ehdottaa, että käyttäjien
aiempi, varsinkin leveyssuuntautunut teknologinen asiantuntemus on olen-
nainen näitä kolmea kytkemisprosessia edesauttava tekijä.
Tulokset tarjoavat useita suunnittelusuosituksia ihmisen ja tietokoneen
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presented in this thesis: John Evans, Sacha Helfenstein, Tommi Ilmonen,
Giulio Jacucci, Pekka Kanerva, Esko Kurvinen, Antti Oulasvirta, Timo
Saari, Sauli Tiitta, and Sakari Tamminen. These colleagues’ areas of ex-
pertise spanned domains that I would never have dreamt of being able to
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Although interactive technologies are always designed with some purposes
of use in mind, they are also always open for reinterpretation and therefore
for a wide array of activities. The way in which a technology becomes
adopted and brought into wider use is therefore strongly determined by
its users, and not only by its design, the advertised image, teaching and
instruction, user manuals, or enculturation into the everyday understanding
of common social practices.
In addition to the above-listed means that may be used for commu-
nicating the intended purpose of use to a supposedly passive user, users
discover new uses for technologies by themselves and apply these to prac-
tical problems1 in everyday life. The process in which a user integrates a
technology into his or her ongoing practices and may invent new uses is
called appropriation (e.g., Dourish, 2003, with more precise definitions to
be reviewed later in this chapter).
Information and communication technologies2 (ICTs) with interactive
functionalities are particularly suitable for appropriation and therefore are
at the focus of this thesis. Information is manipulated – re-represented,
1The term ‘problem’ is here understood in a psychological sense instead of with its
common-sense connotation of undesirable situations in one’s life. In the discipline of
psychology, it refers to a situation in which ‘an organism has a goal but lacks a clear or
well-learned route to the goal’ (Dominowski and Bourne, 1994, p. 23). In this thesis, a
problem is a situation in which completion of a task is interrupted because the person
does not have a means for moving on in the activity.
2The terms ‘technology’ and ‘system’, sometimes also ‘artefact’ and ‘tool’, are used
interchangeably in the text. They all refer to interactive information and communication
technologies.
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16 Chapter 1. Introduction: What is appropriation?
adapted, interpreted, combined, produced, and so on – in various ways in
one’s day-to-day personal and working life.
As a result, over the past 15 years, appropriation has been gain-
ing increasing attention in technology-oriented research fields such as
human–computer interaction (HCI), computer-supported co-operative
work (CSCW), information systems (IS), science and technology studies
(STS), and sociology of consumption. Appropriation is one of the key phe-
nomena in interactive technology usage and a central issue in system design
(Andriessen et al., 2003). Unlike in Taylorian factory work, technologies are
nowadays rarely used according to rigid task sequences to serve predeter-
mined goals. Consequently, the understanding of what the context of use
is has changed and become more heterogeneous. For example, in modern
knowledge work, successful performance may require ability to make use
of the available tools in an adaptive manner. Often usefulness depends on
the situation, since many problems are ill-structured – i.e., do not have a
clearly defined goal state and means of reaching it (Simon, 1973).
Let us consider the example of a user who encounters an error while
working on a computer and cannot bypass it. She may decide to call a
friend for help. But how does she describe the problem in an understand-
able way over the telephone? One option is to take screenshots of the
computer screen; perhaps paste them into PowerPoint, Keynote, or some
other presentation graphics program; and then send them to the friend by
e-mail. The friend may be able to access the e-mail at short notice and call
back after having inspected the problem. Adoption of this solution requires
use of four to five distinct technologies: the original software with which
the error occurs, a screenshot tool, e-mail, the telephone, and optionally a
presentation program. The combination of using these particular tools for
solving problems in computer use, as well as the purposes of the individual
programs in the larger process, may be such as the user has never consid-
ered before and she may invent it ‘on the fly’. Because of this, technologies
should be appropriable: usable to serve multiple, also unforeseen, purposes
and adaptable to different settings, because the conditions of activities vary
from one setting to another. Also, by supporting flexibility, appropriable
technologies help users to get the most from their higher cognitive capac-
ities. Because even the most everyday life today involves a considerable
amount of technology use, appropriable technologies can have a significant
impact on all aspects of life.
Finding out how to create appropriable technologies is, therefore, an
important design problem but also a very tough one. A central problem
underlying all research on appropriable technologies lies in the relation
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that the tool’s design has with its user’s ability to notice opportunities for
use. This formulation calls for more informed psychological and cognitive
research into appropriation.
In order to offer opportunities for impromptu solutions, technologies
must give room for adaptation and improvisation. How this should be
done is a question for which cognitive science can provide a starting point.
Humans have always been creative tool-users (Tomasello, 1999), and impro-
visation in everyday problem-solving is a natural part of human cognitive
functioning. For example, research can reveal how perception and action
interact during situations of technology use and how existing experience
affects the ways in which users evaluate the possibilities for use of techno-
logical features in different tasks and problems. Applying cognitive science
to the research on appropriation is therefore natural and necessary.
However, as was noted in the list of research fields that share an inter-
est in appropriation, the cognitive viewpoint has not been the only entry
point to appropriation’s most important questions. The following section
presents the existing lines of research, including the different interpretations
surrounding the specific meaning of appropriation, and the related findings.
The final part of the chapter returns to the central theme of this thesis –
repurposive appropriation – and initiates an analysis of the cognitive basis
for appropriation.
1.1 Interpretations of appropriation
Appropriation has drawn the interest of many fields of research. Each
has adopted a slightly different interpretation of the term’s primary mean-
ing, which has, in turn, affected the findings that have been presented.
These are summarised in Table 1.1 and in the following sections. Also the
emphasis placed on appropriation’s individual or social characteristics has
differed. As the review will attest, within each interpretation, both em-
phases have usually been addressed, in different studies, but the focus on
social characteristics has been more prominent. The common viewpoints
will be presented in Section 1.2, which also describes their relationship to
the research question of this thesis.
1.1.1 Invention of new purposes of use
The interpretation of appropriation through the notion of purpose of use
is especially commonplace in HCI-related studies. Research within HCI
18 Chapter 1. Introduction: What is appropriation?
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strives to advance understanding of humans and technology, thereby re-
sulting in more informed design of new technologies. One widely adopted
assumption is that technologies are designed with a set of purposes of use
in mind (e.g., Beyer and Holtzblatt, 1998; Sharp et al., 2007). The set
of use purposes envisioned determines the basis for evaluating the quality
of design. If users are able to carry out the tasks foreseen in an efficient
manner, effectively, and find it enjoyable, the design is able to meet its HCI
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objectives. Although the attention to the envisioned purposes of use is not
always explicitly expressed within HCI, it has sensitised researchers and
practitioners in the HCI field to notice whether users deviate from the uses
expected. Observations of such behaviour have been one of the reasons for
HCI researchers’ interest in novel uses and how they emerge. Unexpected
uses and changes in technology use are, therefore, an important aspect of
HCI-based research on appropriation. To a large extent, this applies also
to studies within CSCW, which, as a research field, is close to HCI but
focuses specifically on social phenomena surrounding technology use.
Novel purposes of use are rarely invented without a reason. Instead,
they emerge as responses to specific situational needs that may have devel-
oped gradually over time, or that arise abruptly during a course of action.
Appropriations can be understood as technology-based ways to cope with
such situations. This is the starting point for studies that endorse multi-
purposeness in technology’s design and use (e.g., Dourish, 2003; Dix, 2007).
For example:
Appropriation is the way in which technologies are adopted,
adapted and incorporated into working practice. This might
involve customisation in the traditional sense (that is, the ex-
plicit reconfiguration of the technology in order to suit local
needs), but it might also simply involve making use of the tech-
nology for purposes beyond those for which it was originally
designed, or to serve new ends. (Dourish, 2003, p. 467)
In the most straightforward vein, many HCI and CSCW studies focus
on suggesting principles for design of easily appropriable systems. Such
suggestions have often been practically oriented and intended to inspire
new design thinking without leaning heavily on specific theoretical orien-
tations. They also include suggestions that can be applied when one is
designing for both individual and social contexts of use. The principles
have been expressed most commonly as adjectives and in other descrip-
tive terms. Dourish (1999) lists five such ‘aspects’. Flexibility refers to
providing the user with more control for customisation of the system, and
also openness for application of the system for different kinds of content
and purposes. Technologies should also enable incremental adjustments,
in order to accommodate gradual transformations of use. Because Dourish
sees appropriation primarily as a social process, he suggests that designers
should also take into account the user community, by, for instance, creating
features that add visibility of user actions between users so that novel prac-
tices can be shared (see also Dourish, 1997). Finally, the gradual changes
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also require that the system manifest persistence, preserving a previous
system state, on which later adaptations can be built. Other desirable fea-
tures include playfulness and exploration, which are suggested to increase
the chances of discovery of novel purposes of use (Perry and Rachovides,
2007; Paper 3). A similar kind of list has been presented by Dix (2007).
In some cases, ambiguity supports appropriation. For example, in
computer-mediated communication, users need an opportunity to remain
unresponsive when they so desire. For example, phone users have been
found, in order to avoid losing face in such situations, appropriating the
communication system’s connectivity problems as a legitimate excuse for
not picking up calls (Aoki and Woodruff, 2005; Hancock et al., 2009; Salo-
vaara et al., 2011b).
Designers too can make use of ambiguity. Especially in the design of
non-utility-oriented systems, designers can encourage users to explore by
making systems vague as to their meaning and possible purposes of use.
Ambiguity forces users into making sense of, reflecting upon, and inter-
preting the system’s functionality themselves, thereby possibly arriving at
uses that were not expected (Gaver et al., 2003; Sengers and Gaver, 2006).
From a usability point of view, appropriable technologies feature designs
in which simplicity and multifunctionality should be in balance. Both of
these design goals – simplicity and multifunctionality – have their propo-
nents. When simplicity has been the goal, the systems resemble informa-
tion appliances (Norman, 1999). These are tools that are each designed for
one purpose only, for a ‘restricted, specialized set of tasks’ (p. 61). This
specialisation provides good facilitation for the intended tasks but comes
with a cost. Users will need lots of appliances in order to address all of the
tasks in which ICT can benefit their lives. However, in some cases, users
value adaptability. This is visible in the design behaviours that users may
engage in when they customise and modify everyday environments to be
suitable for their tasks (Wakkary and Maestri, 2007, 2008). Accordingly, at
the other end of the spectrum one finds multifunctional technologies, such
as tailorable systems (see Subsection 1.1.3), that allow users to adapt their
functionality with scripting tools and other adjustments. Multifunctional
technologies’ benefit lies in their suitability for a wide number of purposes,
though with a risk of poor readiness for meeting immediate needs and
mediocre suitability for novice users.
In contrast to the above-mentioned approaches with their rather flexi-
ble theoretical underpinnings and individual vs. social focus, a more clearly
cognitive and individual-oriented way of looking at appropriation is to in-
vestigate the changes in the ways in which users interpret and use technol-
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ogy. These changes always build on users’ existing knowledge. Appropria-
tion takes place when a user perceives an opportunity for using the features
of a technology in a new way, where ‘new’ means that the perception is new
for this particular user (Salovaara, 2006). If the new use solves the user’s
problem, it becomes part of his or her repertoire of uses (Al-Natour and
Benbasat, 2009; Paper 4). This interpretation of appropriation will be dealt
with in more detail in this thesis, from Section 1.2 onward.
1.1.2 Improvisation
Sometimes people need to improvise in order to manage situations
smoothly. Improvisations that involve uses of technologies can be consid-
ered as appropriations. In sociology, analyses of situation-specific impro-
visations are often based on findings from ethnomethodology (EM) and
conversation analysis (CA) – research fields that study co-construction
and maintenance of mutual intelligibility and order in social interaction
(Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984). These closely related research traditions
have been important in HCI and CSCW especially in their compelling ar-
gument for increasing researchers’ attention to situated interaction (Heath
and Luff, 2000; Martin and Sommerville, 2004; Suchman, 1987). Writers
on EM and CA have argued against the practice of building strict models
for human–computer interaction. As an alternative, they advocate focusing
on the ways in which contextual resources are applied in interaction, and
sequential analyses of actions’ implications for later actions. In addition to
the actions of co-present parties, and other features of the situation, EM
and CA maintain that the contextual resources include rules and norms
of acceptable behaviour – e.g., ‘when a phone rings, answer it’ (Brown
and Perry, 2000, p. 623). Users orient to these rules in different ways
and are not ‘cultural dopes’ who would act only ‘in compliance with the
preestablished and legitimate alternatives of action that the common cul-
ture provides’; Garfinkel, 1967, p. 68).
In research on appropriation, the analytical perspective of EM and CA
has been used to investigate the ways in which social norms and rules,
as embedded in the design of technology, have been oriented to by users
in an improvised manner (e.g., Bowers et al., 1995; Button and Harper,
1993). Technologies may be designed to encourage certain organisation-
ally desirable behaviours and constrain others. However, such rigidity in
design does not rule out flexibility in technologies’ use. For example, in
one case, workers were observed entering pieces of data into a system not
because it supported information management within the organisation but
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primarily because writing a report created an impression of orderliness and
professional competence (Brown, 2000, pp. 270–271).
Another approach is to consider technology use as embodied interaction.
Drawing not only from EM and CA but also from literature on phenomenol-
ogy (which partly underlies also EM and CA; see, for example, Heritage,
1984), as well as more recent technological developments in tangible and
social computing, Dourish (2001) maintains that interaction with technolo-
gies, as any human interaction with the world is, are both a social and a
physical phenomenon and that this provides a grounding for the meanings
that users ascribe to technologies. Dourish emphasises the importance of
the user’s direct interaction with the environment instead of one mediated
by his or her mental representations. Designers may steer this interac-
tion by designing constraints and expectations related to the system’s use
into the system’s feature set. How the features are coupled with various
purposes of use is, however, not determined fully by the designer but con-
ditioned by the user’s embodied interactions. To support users’ embodied
interactions in technology use also for unforeseen purposes, Dourish sug-
gests that designers should make an attempt to provide resources for action
instead of attempting to design for particular tasks only (p. 173).
In summary, the works drawing from EM and CA as well as research
drawing from embodied interaction theorise about users’ capabilities of
improvising. These studies also encourage designers to become attentive to
providing opportunities for users’ improvisations.
1.1.3 Customisation and adaptation
Much of this chapter so far has emphasised appropriations’ emergence from
novel perceptions or situated improvisations. However, also other forms
of discovery of novel uses exist, since, in addition to perceiving, the user
can intentionally change the features of the technology, making them more
suitable for his or her needs. This can be encouraged by making systems
adaptable by the users – for example, by providing scripting tools (Cypher
et al., 1993; Henderson and Kyng, 1991; Mørch, 1997; Mørch and Mehand-
jiev, 2000; Lieberman et al., 2006; Nardi, 1993; Stevens et al., 2009; Wulf
et al., 2008).
However, users differ in skill and in their eagerness to write scripts.
Eager users can be classified into at least three types (MacLean et al.,
1990) that have important social roles in discovery and promotion of novel
uses of technology. ‘Tinkerers’ enjoy exploring the system but lack a full
operational understanding. ‘Programmers’ possess in-depth understanding
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of the system but are rarely available to support ordinary users as they
face problems. Additionally, in some cases, a new intermediary role (called
‘handyman’, ‘translator’, ‘gardener’, or ‘mediator’; see Bansler and Havn,
2006; Mackay, 1990; MacLean et al., 1990; Nardi, 1993) emerges to bridge
the gap between the technology-savvy and the ordinary users. Mediators
often provide ICT-related support, with an official or unofficial mandate
from the organisation. By providing help and support, they can also pro-
mote good practices. Designers and managers are advised to support users’
progress from the role of an ordinary user to more advanced roles, and to
create a tailoring culture that activates users (MacLean et al., 1990). How-
ever, studies to date have not identified the individual characteristics that
distinguish the tinkerers, programmers, and mediators from other users in
technology use. Therefore, how such a key worker would be best supported
remains largely unknown.
When one considers the social aspects of sharing novel ways of working,
it is important to increase visibility and sharing of other users’ creations.
If the outcomes of appropriations are visible to other users, they propagate
more easily (Höök, 2006). Pipek (2005, pp. 62–63) has presented an 11-item
list of design principles for tailoring and increased visibility. For example,
a system can help users articulate their work practices such that others can
learn from them, provide visualisations of past use, and be equipped with
tools for exploration and simulation of possible ways of use.
Users may intentionally modify also technologies that are not pro-
grammable. For companies, users’ modifications may present a crucial
source of new innovative thinking that can be harnessed in further design
iterations and new product development (von Hippel, 1988, 2005; Hyysalo,
2004; Hasu, 2001). Sometimes, however, users deviate from companies’ in-
tentions and conflicts arise. Competition for power and the politics of tech-
nology use are consequently often involved in emergent uses. The field of
science and technology studies has documented many processes in which de-
signers, managers, technology policy leaders, and others with development
power have intentionally restricted or banned certain uses or in which users
have started using technologies on their own terms (Abu-Lughod, 1989;
Eglash, 2004; Mackay and Gillespie, 1992; Schäfer, 2011; Winner, 1980).
1.1.4 Trying new features of technologies
It would seem reasonable to assume that appropriation would be more
commonplace among users who are willing to invest time and effort in
learning about new features of technology. However, learning about a new
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feature does not necessarily entail learning about a novel purpose of use.
For example, learning may also be related to more efficient execution of
an already familiar task, or to a purpose of use that the user had been
aware of but only recently decided to become properly acquainted with.
Nevertheless, although studies of feature-related learning and exploration
do not explicitly address appropriation, they may provide useful hypotheses
on factors that constitute part of the underpinnings of inventions of novel
purposes of use specifically.
In contrast to much of the literature cited above, studies in this area
have been mostly quantitative in nature and focused on individual users’
characteristics instead of the social or physical context. In general, users
display the greatest motivation to invest their effort in learning new features
when they do not need to focus only on performance and when they also
find that learning is not complicated (Loraas and Diaz, 2009). However,
they may be unwilling to learn new uses if doing so has side effects for
routines that they are not willing to change (Lindley et al., 2009).
Several individual-oriented constructs have been suggested as underly-
ing factors behind a person’s interest in exploring individual features of
technology or entirely new technologies. These include personal innova-
tiveness in information technology use (Agarwal and Prasad, 1998), micro-
computer playfulness (Webster and Martocchio, 1992; Woszczynski et al.,
2002), and willingness to try to innovate with IT (Ahuja and Thatcher,
2005). This work uses self-reporting scales for computer use traits, atti-
tudes, or users’ goals and has not examined the attributes in relation to
actual novel uses.
It appears that only three quantitative studies have been published to
date on the relationship between individual user characteristics and users’
inventions of new purposes of use. The first one, by Mills and Chin (2007),
following Compeau and Higgins (1995), employed self-efficacy theory (Ban-
dura, 1986) to explain creative use. The authors used self-efficacy, general
computing knowledge, and belief in one’s ability to use computers as the
independent predicting variables. These factors explained 62% of the vari-
ance in creative uses. However, this work too measured creative technology
use with general self-assessments, without measuring actual creative uses.
The second, a very recent study by Sun (2012), addressed ‘adaptive
system use’ (ASU) and its antecedent factors. Here ASU was defined as
exploration of new features, substitution of new ways of working for old
ones, combination of features in new ways, and appropriation of features
for purposes that the user considered not to have been intended by the de-
signers. Sun found that three factors contributed to ASU: novel situations,
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discrepancies in interaction with the computer, and deliberate initiative
to learn new uses. The study measured these factors on a general level
(e.g., with statements such as ‘I applied some features in Microsoft Office
to tasks that the features are not meant for’; see p. A3), without reference
to concretely stated appropriations, and again on the basis of respondents’
self-assessments.
Finally, the third study, addressing appropriation explicitly, is presented
in Paper 6. Its main findings are summarised in the next chapter. This
study examined a set of technology use characteristics (reflective use, ad
hoc use, social use, etc.) as predictors for creative use. The associated
measurement of creative use was calculated from responses to questions on
a predefined set of non-obvious use purposes.
1.1.5 Integration into existing practice
In leisure and work contexts both, systems are often used in joint actions
with other people. This presents another kind of aspect of technology
appropriation. As was noted above, to be successful and effective, systems
and their use need to be integrated into the existing social practice in which
the technologies are embedded (Dourish, 2003).
Integration into practice is strongly linked to social uses of technology.
Studies looking at integration draw from the framework of social construc-
tion of technology. Proceeding from this starting point, they maintain
that technologies and their configurations are determined not only by tech-
nological possibilities but also by social forces (Bijker, 1987; Law, 1987;
MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1998). This is apparent in appropriation: users
contribute to appropriation by adopting uses, making adaptations, and
propagating them further, as well as by restructuring the work processes,
work environment, and technologies. These are examples of activities that
are necessary if one is to ‘make technology work’ (Balka and Wagner, 2006,
p. 229).
Technology-related practices are often also developed from the ground
up. Workers usually trust their peers’ opinions more than their managers’
when it comes to formulating opinions about technologies (Fulk, 1993).
Such opinions incorporate beliefs about other group members’ knowledge
and acceptance of the rules, resources, and capabilities of technology, and
about the degree to which the members agree on the ways in which the tech-
nological structures should be appropriated (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994).
Sometimes workers also create manuals of their own and start organising
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informal tutoring groups. These forms of collaboration also have an effect
on common opinions (Boudreau and Robey, 2005).
Nambisan et al.’s (1999) organisational management study showed that
also organisations are able to affect workers’ perceptions of technologies. In
the study, employees’ awareness of novel purposes of use could be increased
through establishment of technology-focused steering committees (e.g., task
groups and planning teams) that reinforced workers’ exploration intentions.
Other successful means were on-site support services (e.g., user fora, user
labs, and customer support) that encouraged workers’ exploration abilities.
Qualitative longitudinal studies show that often practices of use tend
to stagnate on a group level, which leads to a decrease in appropriation
(Huysman et al., 2003). However, external thrusts such as discrepancies
in the work structures are able to re-stimulate appropriation (Lassila and
Brancheau, 1999; Majchrzak et al., 2000; Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994). Also,
systems that allow more freedom of use, even at the price of a steeper
learning curve, lead to more active appropriation in the long run (Fuller
and Dennis, 2009).
1.1.6 Renewal of structures of work
Practices of technology use in workplaces are by their very nature socially
structured. In the Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) (e.g., DeSanc-
tis and Poole, 1994), technology is seen as embodying structural features
(rules, resources, and capabilities offered by the system) and the spirit (the
intended use of the technology). The AST approach is based on the struc-
turation theory of Giddens (1984; Jones and Karsten, 2008), which brings
together two opposing theoretical viewpoints in sociology: that empha-
sising objective macro-level structures that shape human action and, on
the other hand, the view that social reality and structures are products of
human actions. Giddens proposes a duality of structure, in which three
elements of social interaction – meaning, power, and norms – operate as
mediators between the actions and the structures.
In this framework, technology’s integration into social practice can be
studied as a structuration process; AST posits that structures are embodied
in technologies that act as mediators of change. Integration of technology
into practice can have two outcomes. Depending on whether the integra-
tion takes place in conformance with the spirit, it is appropriated either
faithfully or unfaithfully. Proponents of faithful appropriation maintain
that it ensures optimal use of the system for the organisation (e.g., Rüel,
2002; Dennis et al., 2001; Nambisan et al., 1999).
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A related proposition, also drawing from Giddens, has been put for-
ward by Orlikowski (1992a). In contrast to AST, this focuses on the role
of technology in structuration more neutrally, highlighting its interpretive
flexibility (cf. Pinch and Bijker, 1987), without giving precedence only to
the faithful uses of technology. This is a justified viewpoint in light of long-
term studies showing that also unfaithful appropriations can be beneficial.
Through negotiation and mutual changes in both managers’ and workers’
practices, all appropriations may lead to positive renewals of the structures
(Orlikowski, 1992b, 1996; Rodon et al., 2011; Majchrzak et al., 2000; Tyre
and Orlikowski, 1994; Lassila and Brancheau, 1999).
Early work by Orlikowski (1992a) presented technologies as embodi-
ments of structures, similarly to AST. However, Orlikowski (2000) later
withdrew this assumption. The more recent viewpoint is based on an idea
of emergent structures that users enact through technology use. This ver-
sion maintains that structures are virtual and manifested in humans’ ac-
tions and interactions, as had been proposed already by Giddens (Leonardi
and Barley, 2010; Jones and Karsten, 2008, p. 22).
Appropriation is therefore understood as a technology-related form of
structuration. It may take place gradually or abruptly. In gradual changes,
structures of shared resources are constructed in a piecemeal fashion (Muller
et al., 2005). Abrupt appropriations, in turn, take place especially at times
of discontinuity and discrepancy. Initiating events include introductions
of new technologies, difficulties in carrying out certain tasks, and team
reorganisations (Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994; Majchrzak et al., 2000; Lassila
and Brancheau, 1999).
The focus on integration and renewal makes the research on appropri-
ation different from studies of adoption (e.g., Davis et al., 1989; Davis,
1989; Venkatesh and Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003) and diffusion
(e.g., Rogers, 1995). While adoption refers to the selection of a technol-
ogy for use (or its rejection), appropriation refers to the adaptations that
are necessary for a successful adoption. Also, appropriation does not end
with the user’s decision to adopt the technology. In fact, many studies of
appropriation focus on ‘post-adoption behaviours’ (Jasperson et al., 2005).
Depending on the success of the appropriation process, a technology may
become non-appropriated (not adopted at all), disappropriated (a technol-
ogy in which the user loses interest after initial adoption), or appropriated
(integrated into practice) (Carroll et al., 2003).
Also, studies of adoption are typically focused on quantifications of
technology use, often with a single measurement (e.g., of frequency of use).
But, because the same technology can be used in different ways by different
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people and at different times, the appropriation studies cited in previous
subsections also pay more attention to what users actually do and achieve
with technology than the studies examining adoption do (see Paper 5 and
Section 4.3).
1.1.7 Making the technology one’s own
Integration of a new technology into one’s routines and practices also means
that the user becomes more familiar with it. The technology therefore starts
to feel more personal and part of one’s identity (Carroll et al., 2001; Scifo,
2005). This viewpoint is especially common in sociological studies of do-
mestication whose foci are on both technologies’ functional processes (i.e.,
those related to their purposes of use) and symbolic processes (i.e., to do
with meanings ascribed to them). Early work on domestication (e.g., Silver-
stone et al., 1992) in the 1990s addressed media consumption in domestic
settings, particularly in households’ practices of television use. Researchers
emphasised that the impact of technology on household routines is far from
a deterministic matter (Berker et al., 2006). Instead, the household is an
arena in which technology use involves both pragmatic and moral transac-
tions between its members. Four interrelated non-deterministic processes
– appropriation, objectification, incorporation, and conversion (e.g., Had-
don, 2007, p. 26) – are described, referring to the different ways in which
the transactions render an originally unfamiliar technology personal and
‘domesticated’ (Silverstone et al., 1992). In the terminology of this lit-
erature, appropriation denotes the ways in which technological artefacts
achieve their significance through ownership. The phenomena related to
the purposes for which technology is used are captured within conversion.
Another strand of domestication research has paid attention to
designer–user relations in technology development processes (Sørensen,
2006; Williams et al., 2005). Drawing from the social shaping of technology
approach (e.g., Pinch and Bijker, 1987) and actor–network theory (e.g.,
Latour, 1988), this literature objects to the deterministic view in which
technology has well-defined impacts on people and society. Researchers
have shown that designer–user relations in development projects include
mutual social learning that shapes technology’s meanings and purposes of
use (Williams et al., 2005, p. 7).
Another possibility is to view relation-building with a technology as
sensemaking. According to Weick (1995), sensemaking involves seven prop-
erties: a person’s identity, retrospection, enactment of experiences as nar-
ratives, social context and those who are involved therein, ongoing shaping
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and reaction to the environment, extraction of cues from the environment,
and favouring of plausible explanations over accuracy. Open-ended tech-
nologies require more sensemaking than do other technologies before they
can be adapted to changing conditions of use. In organisations, sensemak-
ing may become one of the mediators’ responsibilities (Bansler and Havn,
2006).
The third viewpoint on ‘making technology one’s own’ comes from
Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), which looks at HCI from a de-
velopmental and systemic perspective. Technology-mediated activity relies
on cultural-historically developed tools and practices. The unit of analy-
sis is the evolving activity system that consists of a subject, a mediating
instrument (a tool), and an object of activity. The tool can be physical
(e.g., a hammer) or intangible (e.g., a set of rules, or any other symbolic
expression or system, including natural language). The same applies for
the object. It can be a material thing (e.g., a hand-crafted item) or an
intangible concept (e.g., a plan; see Bardram, 1997). The social environ-
ment in which the subject is embedded – the community – introduces two
additional mediating relationships: the rules that define the subject’s re-
lation to the community and the division of labour that describes how
the community acts upon the object collectively (Engeström, 1987; Kuutti,
1997). The CHAT framework allows for analyses that take into account
both individual-oriented and social processes involving physical and sym-
bolic entities alike. Technology appropriation is seen as a merging of new
tools into the activity system, transformation of tool use and how these
tools mediate users’ interaction with the objects of their actions (i.e., what
the user wants to achieve). Gradually, through being used, the tool finds a
natural place in the person’s individual repertoire of actions (e.g., Waycott,
2004). This requires the system’s design to support learning along several
dimensions: how the technology is used, what its functions are, what its
purposes of use might be, and how the user is to explore its use further
(Petersen et al., 2002).
1.2 The scope and the research question
The viewpoints presented in the review have certain elements in common:
• The user is seen as an active actor who integrates, adapts, and inter-
prets technology to make it suitable for his or her own purposes.
• The changes in technology use are at the focal point of appropriation.
They occur when users integrate technology into existing practices,
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or when their uses deviate from the most common use patterns. Devi-
ations can denote different things, such as temporary improvisations,
development of new uses that become new resources for action, or
uses that the designer did not consider when developing the system.
• Appropriation refers to two things, with the interpretation depend-
ing on the context in which the word is used: the process (how the
novel aspects of technology-related practices emerge) and the outcome
(what the emergent uses are).
However, the review also shows that the literature on appropriation is
incomplete with respect to some central issues. The following elements
have been poorly addressed:
1. Repurposing – changes of use that are specifically related to uses
of technology for novel purposes. The interpretations of ‘appropria-
tion’ have been varied in previous literature. As was pointed out in
the review, the majority of appropriation-related studies consider the
change in technology use as related to social practices alongside con-
cepts of integration (Subsection 1.1.5), active modification (Subsec-
tion 1.1.3), renewal (Subsection 1.1.6), and making technology one’s
own (Subsection 1.1.7). While addressing several interpretations of
change, the associated arguments have not been developed such that
they address change in the purpose of use. Whilst such change has
been one of the main interests within HCI research (see Subsection
1.1.1), it lacks an underlying theory.
2. The individual user – a contrast to previous research, in which social
processes have been accorded the dominant role. While social pro-
cesses have received a lot of interest, appropriation by an individual
has been addressed in only a few studies. The design-oriented pa-
pers (Subsection 1.1.1) pay attention to individual-oriented issues but
without presenting empirical studies that look at individuals. Find-
ings in end-user computing literature (Subsection 1.1.3), in turn, have
noted the importance of technology-savvy key individuals as sources
of novel use practices, but no in-depth studies have been published
on the factors through which one could fruitfully address the rela-
tionship of technology savviness to the ability to appropriate actively.
The studies of individual users’ interests in trying out new technology
features (Subsection 1.1.4), on the other hand, have been individual-
oriented, but they have focused on learning in a rather general sense
and not on appropriation specifically. Finally, there are a number
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of suitable theoretical frameworks (e.g., ethnomethodology, conver-
sation analysis, cultural-historical activity theory, sensemaking, and
embodied interaction; see Subsections 1.1.2 and 1.1.7) suitable for
more detailed analysis of individuals’ appropriation too, but the re-
view shows that only a few studies exist wherein these frameworks
have been applied empirically to individuals’ appropriation.
This thesis focuses on these two poorly addressed issues. However, the
relationship between the social context and an individual’s action and cog-
nitive processes is complex, and applying focus on an individual introduces
the threat of important aspects of appropriation being neglected. For exam-
ple, individuals’ knowledge is to a large extent acquired from and alongside
other people. In addition, many situations in which technology is used are
embedded in an activity in which also other people play an important role.
Regardless of the obvious importance of the user’s past and present
social context, it is also sensible to assume that individual users’ cognitive
processes too play an important role in appropriation. All groups of people
are composed of individuals who bring something personal to their joint
activities. When they use technology, they mediate the practices that have
been socially developed, and on some occasions they may transform these
by finding new purposes of use. An individual’s role as an independent
appropriator is important, especially when the technologies involve one
user’s interactions at a time. The uses of technology studied in this thesis
– mobile multimedia messaging, mobile comic-strip creation, and digital
photography (see Subsection 1.2.2) – have this characteristic. In addition,
as the theory-building in Chapter 3 indicates, application of theories with
their origins in cognitive science and psychology may yield understanding
that has not yet been considered.
A specific emphasis on individual users was not chosen in advance when
the work for this thesis was begun. Instead, it evolved during the first three
empirical case studies presented in the thesis (i.e., Papers 1, 2, and 3).
The decision to focus on individuals and repurposing, as conceptualised in
this introductory chapter, was based on the observation that the existing
literature had not addressed them as much as it has social processes and
other interpretations of appropriation. Also, narrowing the scope in later
studies (Paper 6) made the possible contribution of the thesis more salient.
The following sections define the central concept – repurposive appro-
priation – explored in this thesis, provide further scoping, and present the
research question.
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1.2.1 A definition of repurposive appropriation
Repurposive appropriation denotes the following:
Definition 1 (Repurposive appropriation).
In repurposive appropriation, a user or a group of users discovers a novel
purpose of use for a technology, ‘novel’ denoting that this use was not
known by the user or the user group at some earlier time. Although re-
purposive appropriation entails a change in technology use, not all changes
are repurposive. For example, integration of a new technology into existing
practice is repurposive only if the technology’s purpose of use also changes
to something that the users did not originally envision. Increased mas-
tery in technology’s manipulation is not repurposive, because it does not
change the technology’s purpose of use. Neither is adopting a new purpose
of use by learning about it from others (e.g., through observation or by
being taught) repurposive appropriation, because then the discovery is not
actually made by the user or group of users in question.
This definition is agnostic of the concepts of ‘intended use’ (cf. de Souza,
2005) and ‘faithful appropriation’ (cf. Chin et al., 2001). These notions refer
to the purposes that a designer, a design team, or the managers thereof have
assumed for the technology. The user, however, may not be aware of such
purposes. In fact, the intended use may actually have many meanings, since
designers and managers may differ in their intentions. Communicating the
intended use to the user is also confounded by many other factors: physical
limitations on transforming the design ideas into concrete features; lack of
time and other resources for design and production; and messages about the
intended use that are presented by peers and in public opinion, advertising,
user manuals, and tutoring. In addition, whatever the features are, they
rarely predetermine their purposes of use fully.
The concept ‘intention’ is, therefore, often imprecise, and comparison
to actual usage is problematic. The definition presented directly above for
repurposive appropriation avoids this problem. Repurposive appropriation
is always a change in relation to the user’s previous understanding of the
purposes of use. When comparisons are needed, the focus can stay on the
user and his or her interpretations only; the designer’s intentions are rele-
vant only to the extent that the user is aware of them. Therefore, this thesis
does not apply the concept of intended use. In addition, while the thesis
focuses on individuals, the definition applies to repurposive appropriations
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both by an individual and by a group. The distinctive criterion is that the
novel use is novel for all parties involved, be they one user or more.
In this thesis, repurposive appropriation is divided into the following
two categories:
Workarounds: discoveries in which a previously unrelated tool is used in
a task in place of a typical tool that in this case is unavailable or
deemed unnecessarily laborious to use. For example, a digital camera
may be used for ‘scanning’ physical documents when a scanner is not
available.
Discoveries of novel activities: discoveries that lead to a completely
new activity for which no need existed before. For example, the
invention of ‘scratching’ in New York in the late 1970s opened up the
possibility of using turntables for creating new kinds of compositions
in hip-hop music (see Goldberg, 2004).
1.2.2 Scope: Workarounds in piecewise visual content cre-
ation
As stated in Section 1.2, this thesis focuses on repurposive appropriations
made by an individual. This approach addresses learning of a novel use
wherein the individual directly has a significant role in the discovery. It
follows that such forms of learning as mimicry or instruction-following will
not be within the scope of the thesis. The reason is that in those cases the
discoveries are made by people other than the one whose technology use
is at the focus of analysis. Co-discovery with other users, however, is ad-
dressed to some extent, insofar as the analytical focus remains on that user
who comes up with something related to an idea of a novel use. The impor-
tance of other users who may provide starting points for such discoveries
will be addressed in the context of situational features of the repurposive
appropriation process (see Subsection 2.5.1). Given that the social context
is important in appropriation, its relation to individual users’ repurposive
appropriation will be elaborated upon in addition, in the discussion (Sec-
tion 4.4).
The specific technological use context that is addressed in this work
is piecewise visual content creation. This scoping stems from the empirical
studies that addressed collocated mobile group messaging (Papers 1 and 2),
comic-style mobile messaging (Paper 3), and digital camera use (Paper 6).
The term ‘piecewise visual content creation’ is used in this thesis to refer to
technologies for creating visual content in a piecewise manner, message by
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message or image by image. This makes their use episodic, meaning that
the use can be segmented into temporally bounded processes (e.g., from
taking a camera phone in one’s hand and starting to compose a message
to sending the message and putting the phone away). These segments, or
episodes, were numerous in the studies’ data. The shared unit of analysis
made it possible to focus on the contextual factors of use on the same level
across all of the technologies studied.
Piecewise visual content creation is well suited to a psychologically ori-
ented analysis and associated theory. In creation of a piece of content, the
visual format of the medium requires that the user attend to the surround-
ing environment in order to find material for the message. This interaction
with the environment is a process involving exploration and planning. In
addition, the user’s prior experience of similar content creation situations
can be expected to affect the way in which the content creation process
unfolds. In Chapter 3, these characteristics will be brought together in
a common model through interpretation of repurposive appropriation as
recognition of the environment’s structures and as problem-solving in which
expertise plays a significant role.
Furthermore, all of the technologies in the empirical studies were used in
everyday life instead of work settings. This was beneficial, since researching
individual users’ repurposive appropriation would have been more difficult
in workplace contexts. Therefore, the analysis of social forces (rules, shared
practices, co-authorship, etc.) could be de-emphasised. Also, the focus on
digital cameras and systems in mobile phones ensured that in most cases
the systems were operated by only a single user. Accordingly, the unit of
analysis could be more easily limited to an individual user.
Thus, the technologies under study were well suited to research on indi-
vidual users’ repurposive appropriation. However, while both workarounds
and discoveries of novel activities were given the focus in the first three
studies (Papers 1, 2, and 3), observations of the latter were rare. Subse-
quently, the thesis focuses specifically on workarounds. This scoping was
also employed already in the planning of the fourth empirical study (Paper
6), which, therefore, addressed only workaround-like appropriations.
However, as a counterpoint to these specifications that narrow the the-
sis’s scope of applicability, the repurposive appropriations studied here do
not presuppose reprogramming (see Subsection 1.1.3) or physical redesign
(e.g., ‘do-it-yourself’ work) by the user. Throughout the thesis, the fo-
cus remains on such repurposive appropriations as any user can perform
without needing to apply special tools or programming skills.
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1.2.3 The research question
In view of the scoping above, the goal of this thesis is to develop a theoret-
ical hypothesis as to the cognitive processes in individuals’ workaround-like
repurposive appropriations.
Satisfying this research goal requires specification of the relationship
between the features of the activity context and the individual’s cogni-
tive processes in that context. Addressing the physical and technological
features of the context is particularly relevant, since interaction with tech-
nologies always has a physical dimension in the form of button presses,
pointing, movement, etc., which are oriented toward making use of techno-
logical features. Empirical studies of repurposive appropriation are needed,
for description of the relationship between context and cognitive processes.
Any hypothesis proposed must be compatible with observations of repur-
posive appropriations in natural settings. The papers in this thesis there-
fore present three field experiments (described in Papers 1, 2, and 3) that
generated empirical data and served as a basis for a model describing the
required relationship between the context and cognitive processes (see Sub-
section 2.5.1). The theoretical work was then based on this foundation.
Furthermore, the cognitive processes need to be described and explained
in relation to other psychological and cognitive theories. Chapter 3 reviews
psychological theories that can be used to explain repurposive appropria-
tion. They link repurposive appropriation with higher cognitive functions
such as problem-solving, creativity, and thinking. The chapter presents
these alternatives, analyses their strengths and weaknesses, and bases its
development of theory on those that are strongest. The goal is in theory
development for the moments when users perceive a novel opportunity for
action.
The answer given for the research question has three limitations, some of
which have already been mentioned. The theoretical hypotheses’ empirical
evaluation is not part of the thesis. Also, this work does not address the
relationship of repurposive appropriation to lower-level cognitive functions
such as memory or attention that support higher cognitive functions (e.g.,
problem-solving). The reason for imposing this limitation is related to the
exploratory goal of the thesis and is explained in more detail in Section
2.1. Additionally, although repurposive appropriation is a process that
builds on previous appropriations and experiences of technology use, this
thesis does not address the cyclical and developmental nature of longer-
term appropriation processes.
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Chapter 2
Empirical studies
Four exploratory empirical studies were carried out for better understand-
ing the phenomena in repurposive appropriation and supporting the de-
velopment of theory on its underlying processes. The following sections
present the research strategies adopted in these studies and an overview of
each. This consideration is concluded with a summary of the limitations of
the research strategy chosen.
2.1 Research strategy
McGrath’s research strategy circumplex (1981; see Figure 2.1) can be used
to deliberate on one’s research methods in different research settings. The
circumplex has two dimensions: universal vs. particular concern and obtru-
sive vs. unobtrusive research operation. These dimensions define four quad-
rants (I–IV) of research methodology and eight possible research strategies.
McGrath maintained that when planning research, the researcher
should consider the weaknesses and strengths of different methods. He pre-
sented three mutually exclusive desiderata (A–C) that characterise good
research: A) generalisability, which is greatest in sample-based surveys and
computer simulations; B) precision, at its highest in laboratory experi-
ments; and C) realism, highest in field studies. The dilemma for the re-
searcher is that these desiderata are located at maximally distant positions
along the circumplex’s circumference, so no study can excel in addressing
all of them. Also, an attempt to satisfy two desiderata makes the study
particularly weak with respect to the third desideratum. For example, a
researcher who focuses on precision (B) and realism (C) is likely to se-
lect field experiments or experimental simulations as the research strategy.
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Figure 2.1: Research strategy circumplex (adapted from McGrath, 1981,
p. 183) with the studies of this thesis placed in the respective octants.
However, since these are methods in which either the sample size is small or
the context does not permit exercising better control of the phenomenon,
such methods are of relatively low generalisability (A). Generalisability, in
turn, would be best obtained by means of sample surveys. As a result, no
research strategy can be considered better than another per se. McGrath
maintains that, instead of embarking on one method, the researcher should
contemplate the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy and choose the
one that seems best for the task at hand. Also, studies should be consid-
ered as a series, such that different strategies would be adopted in different
parts of the series, thereby addressing the three desiderata in a mutually
strengthening manner.
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As was concluded in Section 1.2, no existing theory from Section 1.1
could be applied for the present research question. Given this, the studies
for this thesis had to be designed to provide data suitable for exploration
and generation of new endogenous theoretical hypotheses. This led to a
decision to start the research by focusing on desideratum C with a goal of
collecting contextually rich data and desideratum A with a goal of develop-
ing theoretical hypotheses that could be generalised. The most important
limitation with this strategy was that it did not address desideratum B
(precision) and consequently did not include controlled experiments.
With these choices, the methodology for the studies was not typical of
studies in cognitive science or psychology. Open-ended descriptive studies
were carried out although they produce indirect and uncertain data with
respect to cognitive processes. Because mental processes are not directly
observable, their research would have required controlled studies on con-
currently occurring repurposive appropriation processes.
However, the research goal for this thesis was to develop theoretical
hypotheses on cognitive processes involved in repurposive appropriation.
The open-ended methodology was chosen because it was felt that the phe-
nomenon required it. Repurposive appropriation was seen as being heavily
embedded in the surrounding context. Starting the research with a con-
trolled method and with precision (B) as the primary desideratum would
have entailed a risk of disregarding something crucial by embracing a re-
search design of questionable ecological validity.
The cost of choosing open-ended studies and realism as the starting
points is that the interpretive steps from observations to theoretical con-
clusions were likely to be long and therefore to produce uncertain and
potentially erroneous information on the target phenomenon. In Chapter
3, where hypotheses are developed for repurposive appropriation, allevia-
tion of this problem is sought through a review of competing theories and
choice of the most salient ones at each stage. It is important to confirm
findings later with experimentally controlled further studies. Such studies
will be proposed in Section 3.5, and the limitations mentioned here will be
addressed further in the discussion, in Section 4.1.
2.1.1 Realism
As stated above, despite its importance for system design, repurposive ap-
propriation is a little-studied subject. Existing literature therefore does
not provide strong suggestions on where to direct one’s research. Also, re-
purposive appropriation is a phenomenon occurring in a natural context in
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Web-based survey
which a multitude of characteristics of everyday life can play a role. There
is no a priori knowledge as to which contextual, social, and personal char-
acteristics are more important than others in repurposive appropriation.
Because of the paucity of existing firm research findings, the first three
studies presented in this thesis (see Table 2.1) were carried out by means of
an open and exploratory research strategy and naturalistic data collection.
The goal was to address desideratum C (i.e., realism) by observing repur-
posive appropriations and appropriation processes in situ and narrowing
the research focus until more understanding about the phenomenon had
been gained.
A good-quality open-ended field experiment in HCI requires that the
collection of data about technology use be carefully and comprehensively
executed. If possible, the data should be rich with examples of the topic of
interest. This can be challenging if the phenomenon occurs unpredictably.
Also, the behaviour observed should be as close to natural as possible, even
if obtrusive methods such as videotaping and interviewing may be necessary
in the data collection.
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In the present studies (Papers 1, 2, and 3), these requirements were
addressed by carrying out technology interventions with mobile communi-
cation technology prototypes. Through being designed and implemented
by the research team itself (Papers 1 and 2) or in close co-operation with
the developers (paper 3), they could be equipped with comprehensive data
logging features both at device level and on the server. This made it possi-
ble to collect very high-quality information about the communications that
took place via that media channel. To complement data logging, the other
research methods consisted of participant observation using video cameras
(Papers 1 and 2) and periodic interviews (Paper 3). The challenge that re-
purposive appropriations may occur only rarely was alleviated via study of
prototypes of possible future communication tools. The participants could
not have experienced similar communication opportunities before, which
meant that the users had not yet developed routinised use practices for
the technologies. This increased the probability that novel uses could be
observed.
2.1.2 Generalisability
While open-ended studies are useful in contextualising the topic of interest
and in revealing relations to other phenomena, their problem is that they
provide fewer opportunities for generalisation beyond the scope of a small
group of users or for more general theory-building. This was true also in
the above-mentioned field experiments.
Remedies for this weakness were sought in Papers 4, 5, and 6, situated
in opposite octants in the research strategy circumplex (see Figure 2.1,
above). These three papers were aimed at singling out generally applicable
theoretical starting points (desideratum A) for repurposive appropriation.
Paper 4 presents a theoretical model for repurposive appropriation,
drawing from ecological psychology, particularly schema-based mental rep-
resentations and Neisser’s (1976) perceptual cycle. Schema-like representa-
tions are one of the building blocks in the theoretical hypotheses presented
in Chapter 3.
Paper 5 offers critical comment on technology acceptance model (TAM;
e.g., Davis et al. 1989; Davis 1989; Venkatesh and Davis 2000; Venkatesh
et al. 2003) research. TAMs represent a theoretical viewpoint and assump-
tions that are in opposition with the central assumptions of repurposive
appropriation research. Paper 5 criticises these models for poor sensitivity
to the purposes of use that users have for technology. If the variation in
the individual purposes is not known, the utility of studying what features
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lead to a technology being accepted by the users becomes debatable. The
arguments raised in the paper are discussed in Subsection 4.3.
Finally, Paper 6 is a quantitative survey-based comparison of eight dis-
tinct individual-oriented factors that could explain users’ propensity for
discovering workarounds and adopting the discovered uses for their recur-
rent use practice. The purpose of the study was to identify those explana-
tory factors that are most important for repurposive appropriation. The
technology under research was digital cameras. The findings are presented
in Section 2.4.
Also this thesis belongs to the formal theory octant. It presents hy-
potheses (see Chapter 3) addressing the underlying cognitive constructs
and processes of repurposive appropriation. It also provides a basis for con-
trolled empirical studies that would maximise the heretofore unaddressed
desideratum B (i.e., precision).
The following sections present the field experiments conducted as part
of the thesis research, presenting the technologies studied, overviews of the
data collection methods, and the main findings about repurposive appro-
priation. As was already noted in Section 1.2, the first three studies – of
mGroup, CoMedia, and Comeks – did not limit their focus to addressing
individual users’ repurposive appropriation. Instead, they examined re-
purposive appropriation in a group of users. The difference between the
research question of this thesis and the aims of these three studies reflects
the change that took place during the dissertation process. In a later stage,
the focus was narrowed to the decision to study the individual’s repurpo-
sive appropriation, as is evident in Papers 4–6. The more general focus of
Papers 1–3 can be considered also as a factor that may increase the eco-
logical validity of the thesis, in that they provided data for conceptualising
the various contextual features, including the social ones.
The purpose of this chapter of the thesis is to develop understanding
of an overarching outcome across all of the empirical papers. The result is
presented in Figure 2.8, at the end of the chapter, after the summaries of
the case studies.
2.2 Collocated mobile group messaging: mGroup
and CoMedia
Mobile phone applications mGroup and CoMedia were prototypes for rich
computer-mediated interaction among members of a geographically dis-
tributed group. Their use was studied in open-ended field experiments
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Figure 2.2: mGroup’s user interface: the list of media stories (A), messages
and replies in a story (B), and a view of a single message (C).
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Figure 2.3: CoMedia’s user interface. Unlike that of mGroup, the interface
provides awareness information on all of its screens. The ticker box at the
top of the screen informs about the other online users in the system (A), in
the same media story (B), and in the same message (C). The users’ online
statuses were described by means of member icons and on a dedicated
screen (D).
during Neste Rally events in 2005 and 2006. Neste Rally is part of World
Rally Championships competition and one of the largest public events in
the Nordic region. It brings hundreds of thousands of people to central Fin-
land each August to spectate as cars speed along gravel roads. Spectators
usually attend the event in groups. Traffic jams caused by the many spec-
tators often force a group to split and watch the competition from different
locations. This increases the need to co-ordinate and communicate.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present the user interfaces of the two systems. Users
could send messages with images (in CoMedia, also video and sound) to
each other. These messages were gathered into message threads called ‘me-
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dia stories’ that the users could create as needed. CoMedia was a successor
of mGroup and featured also a Web interface, an event guide, and real-time
awareness cues related to other participants’ activities in the system. The
research goal in both pieces of research was to study emergent situated in-
teractions and communication patterns with and through the devices, and
the resulting repurposive appropriations.
The method
The method – in situ observation – made use of a hidden observer who
had real-time access to all the traffic in the communication channel. Two
observers in the field used video cameras to record user behaviour and were
supported by a third researcher, who monitored messaging at the server
(Salovaara et al., 2006b). When a participant sent a message, the hidden
observer notified the field researchers with a mobile text message. The
observers in the field could then prepare themselves for videotaping the
behaviour. Conveniently for this research method, typically mGroup’s and
CoMedia’s messages arrived on the users’ phones with a delay of several
minutes, because of the low mobile data traffic bandwidth in the rural
countryside. Delivery of a mobile text message was not hampered by such
delays.
The in situ observation was complemented with qualitative content
analysis and post-study interviews about messages. Interviews were useful
especially in contextualising those message exchanges that had taken place
when the two observer-researchers were not present (i.e., at night and in
system use on the days before the rally event).
Repurposive appropriations
There were 230 and 164 messages created and sent in the mGroup and
CoMedia study, respectively. Analyses in both of the Papers (1 and 2)
focused on repurposive appropriations mostly on the group level. With
mGroup, the groups appropriated the media stories for co-ordination of
activities, maintaining awareness of each other, and for constructing small-
scale events of their own through messaging (e.g., a story listing group
members’ bets for the winner of the rally). The CoMedia study showed
similar group-level repurposive appropriations: on-site reporting, keeping
up to date on each other’s undertakings, remote spectating, co-ordinating
and making plans, reliving and knowing what others have done, and joking.
Figure 2.4 presents a sequence of message exchanges from which many
features of the messaging context can be discerned. Although the sequence

















































































Figure 2.4: Two subgroups maintaining awareness of each other’s actions in
mGroup field experiments. The message stream is presented in the middle.
does not exemplify repurposive appropriation, it shows how the message
creation is interleaved with other social activities at both ends (at a rally
stage and on a minibus). It is assumed that the same situational features
are present also in situations in which users appropriate.
Figure 2.4 shows that several situational features (e.g., a sleeping friend
and the speedometer dials) could affect the way in which messages were
composed and how the communication unfolded. Furthermore, the mes-
sages were created collectively, in joint agreement by the people co-present.
Therefore, both the social and the physical features of the surroundings
provided inspiration for messaging content.
In addition, in other messaging situations also technological features,
such as video capture, could be sources of inspiration. The participants in
the CoMedia study consisted of amateur rally drivers and mechanics. They
explained that they could better appreciate the rally drivers’ skills if they
could not only see bits of the road but also hear the sounds of the engines
in a video clip. The video capture and the participants’ expertise in rally
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Figure 2.5: Screenshots of comic-strip creation using Comeks: start screen
(A); screen after insertion of an image (B); what the user sees after having
added a white border, a speech bubble, and an icon (C); and when the
system is ready for another slide (D). When multiple frames have been
created, they are shown in a sequence (E).
driving made video clips an efficient form of communication. The impor-
tance of different kinds of situational features is discussed at more length
in Section 2.5, which summarises the findings of the empirical studies.
The benefit of in situ observation was in its ability to capture the
physical context, the users’ behaviour, and the social setting surround-
ing the piecewise visual content creation process. On the other hand, the
method was resource-heavy, requiring continuous participation from three
researchers and making it infeasible to observe those repurposive appro-
priations that developed slowly. Also, the observers had limited options
for intervening and enquiring about the ongoing activities, because some-
times it was feared that doing so would interrupt participants’ activities
and hinder further actions related to repurposive appropriations.
2.3 Comic-style mobile messaging: Comeks
Comeks was a specialised multimedia message composer for mobile phones.
Its idea was conceived by the author and was developed into a commer-
cial product by Bulbon Ltd. Comeks could be used to create expressive,
comic-style multimedia messages in a tailor-made Multimedia Messaging
Service (MMS) editor. The design goals were to improve the possibilities
for annotating images in an MMS message, creating stories, and making
messaging more entertaining. The main screens of the Comeks user inter-
face are presented in Figure 2.5.
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Method
Informed by research method experiences in the mGroup and CoMedia
studies, the Comeks study was based on periodic interviewing instead of
direct observation. The phones in the field experiment had ContextPhone
logging software installed (Raento et al., 2005), providing unobtrusive log-
ging of the phones’ use and their near-real-time monitoring on the server
side. At approximately three-week intervals, the messages of each user
were collected together and one-to-one cued-recall interviews were held to
discuss the messages. The goal with this periodical process was that in-
terviews would take place when the memories of messaging situations were
still fresh. In total, the eight participants were interviewed 24 times over
the course of nine weeks. In that time, the participants sent 90 messages
with Comeks. The interviews focused on (i) the situations in which the
messages had been created, (ii) why a message had been created in such-
and-such a way, (iii) why the message had these particular recipients, and
(iv) (in the case of a received message) what the reactions to it and the
subsequent actions had been.
Repurposive appropriations
Repurposive appropriations of Comeks were studied by focusing on in-
dividual users and were observed on three levels: (i) increased mastery
(i.e., appropriations of the application’s features for more expressive mes-
sage creation)1, (ii) replacement of existing communication channels with
Comeks, and (iii) new communicative acts. Level ii corresponded mostly
to workarounds, while level iii was closest to discoveries of novel activities.
In addition to generating data on the physical and social features of
the message creation context (as in the mGroup and CoMedia studies), the
Comeks study provided information about the use of individual techno-
logical features. Figure 2.6 presents workaround appropriations related to
textual annotation techniques. When annotating images and adding speech
bubbles, users often ran out of empty space in the frames because they did
not want to occlude parts of the underlying images. During the first three
weeks of the study, they discovered three workarounds to cope with this
problem: using transparent bubbles, squeezing the images to make space on
the sides, and complementing Comeks with a standard MMS editor. With
1Increased mastery was classified as appropriation in the associated paper, but it is
not in this thesis, where a stricter definition has been adopted (see Subsection 1.2.1).
Therefore, the occurrences of increased mastery have not been included in the analysis
in this chapter.
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Figure 2.6: Comeks’s standard annotation feature (A) and three repurpo-
sive appropriations that enabled writing more text in the messages (B–D).
Option D was based on a hack: use of a standard MMS editor’s text fields
at the time of sending the message when the standard editor took control
of the actions. Users discovered this extension without Comeks developers’
intention.
the aid of the data, the origins of these appropriations could be traced back
to individual participants and messages that first featured these solutions.
When participants learned the new techniques from each other’s messages,
these techniques became part of their message composition processes as
well and were used alongside the previously mastered techniques. A partic-
ularly rich way of combining these techniques is presented in Figure 2.7’s
third comic strip.
In the study, repurposive appropriations resulted not only from novel
uses of technological features (as exemplified above) but also from obser-
vations of features in the physical environment and social interactions that
could serve as elements in messages. Examples of creative use of such
situational features could be seen already in the mGroup study (e.g., the
message chain in Figure 2.4), but this phenomenon was more evident in
the Comeks study. The first two comic strips in Figure 2.7 show an early
message exchange between two participants from the second week of the
study. These messages provided inspiration for more messages later. The
latter included an exchange of similar thematically related stories a few
weeks later and four collaboratively created comic stories. These socially
created messages led to a discovery of a novel social pastime and a topic
about which both the participants involved and the recipients spoke recur-
rently in the interviews. The third story in Figure 2.7 is an example of
these jointly created messages.
Compared to the mGroup and CoMedia studies’ in situ observation, pe-
riodic interviewing improved the possibilities for comparing the changes in
an individual participant’s usage to those of the rest of the group. Also, the




Figure 2.7: Messages between two participants in the Comeks study.
duration of the study could be extended, which rendered a greater variety of
repurposive appropriations observable. On the other hand, periodic inter-
viewing remained dependent on the system’s overall success and popularity
among the participant group. In addition, although interviewing improved
the access to users’ underlying reasons for repurposive appropriations, the
data were collected after the fact. Participants’ reports on their past ac-
tions are likely to feature retrospective generalisations and rationalisations
as well as be based on false memories. The analysis could not therefore be
brought to the level of cognitive processes and strong individual-oriented
theoretical hypotheses. Naturally, the analysis of the message creation con-
text too may contain errors, for the same reason. This problem, related
to the deliberate decision to focus on realism in the research strategy, was
discussed in Section 2.1.
However, the interview excerpts do make it possible to identify some of
the primary sources of influence in the piecewise visual content creation2
process. An analysis of influences was carried out as part of the study,
although its results are not presented in Paper 3.
2For a definition of piecewise visual content creation, which served as the overall
framing of activities studied in this thesis, see Subsection 1.2.2.
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Table 2.2: Classification of sources of influence in piecewise visual content
creation, based on an analysis of Comeks data, where the abbreviations in




Features of Comeks and the mobile phone that enabled or
constrained possible message-creating actions. Examples of
Comeks’s features in Figure 2.6 are the space constraint in
each message frame, the speech bubble feature, the image
squeezing feature, and Comeks’s use of the phone’s standard
MMS editor at the time of message delivery. Technological
features constituted a heterogeneous set of properties, not
always intentionally implemented, and could also be other
physical or interaction-linked factors that became relevant
for the participants in certain contexts and tasks.
Suggestions
(sugg)
Message composition ideas learned from other participants,
either directly through their participation in the message




Physical features and the people the participant considered
to be material for a message or that/whom he or she had to
attend to when planning or carrying out the message
creation. Physical features included objects and the
environment that could be used as image content or that
changed the possibilities for taking pictures (e.g., lighting).
In the case of people, the difference from suggestions (i.e.,
the previous item) is that here the other people were
passive contributors who did not participate in the message




Features of the unfinished content created within Comeks,
including also images captured with the mobile phone’s
camera where there was an intention to use them in
Comeks messages.
Purpose The intended final form of the message and its purpose
(e.g., sending a piece of information to another person,
performing artistic expression, spending time together by
composing a message, or combining these). In the excerpt
presented below, the portions tagged with ‘purpose’ refer to
the development of an idea of a film trailer comic strip.
Plan The steps considered for production of the desired content.
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The analysis was based on interview excerpts and message content, pro-
ceeded in a bottom-up fashion, and was informed by grounded theory (GT)
methodology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). A rigorous GT analysis applies
a constant comparative method by which tentative theoretical hypotheses
are repeatedly refined via gathering of further data. These data are delib-
erately sampled for critical evaluation of the present hypotheses. As the
analysis progresses, the coding of the content proceeds to increasingly so-
phisticated levels (open, axial, selective, and theoretical coding; see Strauss
and Corbin, 1990) as the theoretical hypotheses get stronger. Rigorously
applied GT interleaves the data collection and the analysis. This strength-
ens theory development because then the new data are better suited to the
evaluation of existing hypotheses.
In the present study, GT’s different levels of coding were not strictly
followed, because the task had already been set as classification of the
message creation process’s sources of influence. Also, the nine-week trial
period had already elapsed, so data collection could not be interleaved
with analysis. However, the constant comparative method was used in the
development of such codes for the sources of influence as would be applicable
to all message creation situations that the participants had described in the
interviews.
The following results emerged from the analysis. From the user, piece-
wise visual content creation required sometimes complex deliberation be-
tween the message composition plan and the various sources of influence,
which included the opportunities afforded by Comeks, the physical and
social environment that could be used as a resource for photographs, the
ideas learned from the other participants, and the content of the unfinished
message. The participants appeared to attempt to match these sources
of influence against their ongoing message creation plan. The opposite
was also seen; the technological, physical, and social influences affected the
message creation plan. The classification of different sources of influence is
presented in Table 2.2, and its use is illustrated by presentation of how the
creator of Figure 2.7’s third strip (Eva) describes the strip’s creation to the
researcher (R) in the following, previously unpublished interview excerpt.
The sources of influence and the points at which she describes her overall
composition plan are indicated with codes along the side in the excerpt.3
3For the sake of clarity, the tag ‘tech’ has been omitted from places that would indicate
Comeks’s camera feature (e.g., ‘I’d take some photos’). Without this omission, the code
would appear so frequently in the excerpt that it would compromise the readability of
the other codes and the places to which they are referring.
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R: At what stage did you get an idea for this? I mean, it




Eva: It started with a chat with Oskari. Then he said that this
thing we were talking about was stupid because I was such
a bore, and then I grabbed that flower [see the last frame
of the third message in Fig. 2.7] in my hand and in front of
his face, although he was still talking to me. That was kind
of a joke. That was when we were creating that sneezing
message [see second message in Fig. 2.7] together. So I
put that flower there and said ‘don’t disturb me’. Then, I
think, Oskari said: ‘Hey hey, I still have something to say.’
I was like: ‘Yeah, yeah, make that kind of a secret spy look’
[. . . ].
R: When you said that, did you already have an idea of want-
ing to create that kind of long comic?
plan
env’l, purpose
Eva: First I just thought that I’d take some photos of those
situations [. . . ]. That Oskari is a kind of secret agent but
in fact a more comical kind of agent. [. . . ]










Eva: Yeah, a bit, but this one’s the only one that made it to the
final one. Then I wanted to take some shots related to Asif.
I wanted to have that scarf just like that. That became
mega-good, that shot. Then I thought: ‘This’s going to be
the bad guy!’ [. . . ]. Then I took a photo of a bus; that’s
my keychain [. . . ]. I did not plan what to do with it back
then [. . . ]. Then a bit later I thought, any kind of a story is
fine, and that there has to be a woman. It’s from my bag,
this photo of the lady.
[. . . ]
Then I was in a Swedish class, and I wrote– it was green,
that pen– I wrote on the back of some shop receipt that
going commando text. And then I changed it a bit, swapped
the colours, so that it became red, that text. And at the
previous break I had taken a shot of Oskari when I had
said: ‘Try to look like a ninja.’
[. . . ]
R: Then there’s still this buckle.







Eva: Yes, it is from this bag. So I had all of these ready, and
I think I went to do some shopping downtown, and that
one’s from Forum’s H&M. When you enter, there’s a blue
lamp in the ceiling. This one was blue, so I took it there.
[. . . ]
First I just took the photos [. . . ]. Then I went to another
shop, JC, and there was a special-bargain note, and this one
was red there. I made it even a bit brighter red [. . . ]. But





That twilight-zone pictures idea came when I chatted with
one friend over the Net. I told her about my day [probably
asking for suggestion for the strip], and then she replied.
The idea totally reached out like [a creature] from a drain,
unrelated to everything, and she wrote ‘twilight zone’. And
then I was like ‘Ahh, sounds good!’.
The excerpt shows how content creation was shaped by the user’s plan
for the message composition; by the state of the unfinished message; and
by her attention to the technological, social, and environmental features.
These features provided opportunities for, and constraints to, the plan’s
completion.
The excerpt may appear to be weak on examples of repurposive appro-
priation. However, both the environment and the technological features
were appropriated for new purposes in this process. Also, two repurpo-
sive appropriations of technological features took place during this message
creation. Eva’s description reveals that she collected the photographs first
in the phone’s image gallery, from which she transferred them to Comeks
for final message composition. For Eva, this was the first time using the
phone’s image gallery with Comeks. Previously, she had always shot the
images by using Comeks’s inbuilt camera functionality, which offers fewer
possibilities for gathering image material for message creation. Another
sign of repurposive appropriation was that this message involved extensive
use of different speech bubble styles to make suitable space for text.
According to the analysis, a finished message was a result of an adap-
tation to the possibilities and constraints in the environment and the tech-
nological features. The findings are consistent with, and specify further,
those on the piecewise visual content creation process in the mGroup and
CoMedia studies. The converging evidence from the three studies (Pa-
pers 1, 2, and 3) points toward a hypothesis that the technological, social,
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environmental, and content-specific features listed in Table 2.2 play an im-
portant role in all piecewise visual content creation. This hypothesis will
be expanded upon in Subsection 2.5.1.
2.4 Everyday use of digital cameras
The results from the previous studies were focused on the immediate con-
text of repurposive appropriation but did not inform about its antecedent
factors in a systematic way. The Web-based survey study of digital camera
uses (Paper 6, n = 2,379) was carried out to address this issue. Instead
of remaining within the research strategy that seeks only to maximise re-
alism, the study in question focused on complementing the findings with
generalisable results (see Section 2.1).
The Web-based survey searched for factors that would explain the differ-
ences between digital camera users’ repurposive appropriation levels. With
this goal, it resembled von Hippel’s (2005) surveys that investigated pre-
dictive factors of lead-user innovations. The foci, however, were different
here: von Hippel measured, for example, modifications to original equip-
ment in different sports communities and identified lead users on the basis
of differences in respondents’ community involvement. The present study,
in contrast, addressed new uses that did not require modifications, and the
predictors were tied to individual users’ differences in technology usage.
In the study presented in Paper 6, factors belonged to three groups of
variables: demographic background, level of experience, and orientation to
photography. Demographic background variables consisted of factors not
related to photography: the respondent’s gender, age, education level, and
income, as well as whether the respondent had pets, children, and/or grand-
children. Experience factors consisted of general-level photography-related
factors: use tenures and frequencies for film, digital, and phone cameras, as
well as whether camera use was or had been part of the respondent’s work,
hobbies, or studies. Orientations consisted of eight factors that described
the respondent as a camera user. On the basis of a factor analysis, the
number of factors was decreased to six in the final analysis: self-reflexivity,
use reflexivity, spontaneity, exploration, technology cognizance, and consul-
tancy (i.e., social use). The definitions of these are provided in Table 2.4.
Together, these three groups of variables served as predictors in regression
and other types of analyses of the data.
Two measures of appropriation were used as dependent variables in the
analysis: (i) the level of personal discovery, which denoted the respondent’s
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Table 2.4: Six digital camera usage orientations measured in Paper 6
Orientation Description
Self-reflexivity Increased sense of self-criticism with respect to
photography and camera use skills.
Use reflexivity Reflection on the success of one’s photos, immediately
after shooting or afterward.
Spontaneity Taking photos spontaneously in a spurt of action,
without always thinking before acting.




Having an accurate understanding of how a digital
camera works and how its features can be combined
with other technologies and tools.
Consultancy Learning new ways of use from others through
teaching, observation, or exchange of ideas.
own role versus the social basis of discovery, ranging from discoveries com-
pletely on one’s own to mimicry of others, and (ii) the extent of adoption
of the creative use, which ranged from no further use at all to habitual con-
tinuous application of the novel use at a later time. Values for both were
calculated from respondents’ answers to questions pertaining to discoveries
and long-term uses of eight workaround-like digital camera appropriations:
mirror, map, note-taking tool, scanner, memory/storage, lamp, instruction
tool, and periscope. Their descriptions are provided in Table 2.5.
The level of personal discovery was calculated on the basis of the lev-
els of contribution that the respondents had had in the discoveries of the
eight workarounds, ranging from no contribution (e.g., the respondent had
been instructed to use her digital camera as a scanner) to full contribu-
tion (e.g., the respondent had discovered the use as a scanner all by herself
without other people’s presence). The overall personal discovery level was
obtained by taking an average of the eight workaround-specific personal dis-
covery levels. However, because not all respondents had employed all eight
workarounds and some did not remember the situations in which they had
learnt these uses, the average was taken only from those workarounds of
which the respondent had a memory. Details of the operationalisation and
data collection are provided in Paper 6.
Compared to the operationalisation of personal discovery, calculation of
the level of adoption was considerably simpler, since all respondents could
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Table 2.5: Eight digital camera workarounds studied in Paper 6
Workaround Description
Mirror Pointing the camera toward oneself – to see how one’s
face looks, for example.
Map Taking a photo of a map and using that photo in place
of a paper map.
Note-taking device Using the camera for taking notes when the content is
highly visual (e.g., when shopping for clothes).
Scanner Capturing printouts and text as images with a camera.
Memory/storage Plugging the camera into a computer for use similar to
that of a USB memory stick.
Lamp Exploiting the camera as a light source.
Instruction device Using a sequence of photos to provide step-by-step
instructions.
Periscope Inspecting places that are otherwise inaccessible to
human vision but where a camera can enter.
indicate whether they were frequently using each of the eight workarounds.
Also in this case, the overall level of adoption was obtained by taking an
average of the workaround-specific values.
To summarise, in the regression analyses, three groups of variables (de-
mographic background, level of experience, and orientation to photography)
were used to predict two measures of appropriation (discovery of a novel
use and its long-term adoption). The purpose of the study was to compare
the predictive variables in the three groups against each other in order to
identify those that are important for repurposive appropriation. The next
subsection presents the results of these analyses and three other research
questions addressed in the study.
Frequency of repurposive appropriation and its antecedent factors
In all, five research questions (RQs) were pursued, with the following find-
ings emerging:
RQ1 How common are repurposive appropriations? On average, 48% of
the respondents had employed each workaround once or more often.
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Table 2.6: Operationalisation of the technology cognizance construct




I have acquainted myself with, more or less, every
feature of my camera(s).
Understanding of
cause and effect
I know how to adjust the settings of a camera such
that the photos are usually of good quality.
Awareness of the
good and bad sides
of the device
I know the most important technological strengths
and weaknesses of my camera(s).
Formats I know which storage formats to use in response to
different needs for image quality and file size.
Data transfer
between devices
I transfer images between different devices
(computers, cameras, and other storage devices)
frequently.
Use of photos in
conjunction with
other digital media
I use the photos that I have taken embedded in other
media (with text, in presentations, via graphics
programs, on Web pages, etc.).
Command of other
electronic devices
I am used to using and taking up different electronic
devices.
RQ2 How frequently are the repurposive appropriations learned individu-
ally? The study suggests that most users can be classified as either
people who learn all of the repurposive appropriations socially from
others or users who discover them independently, without any help
from others. Personal discovery of a repurposive appropriation was
slightly more common than learning it from others (20.3% vs. 16.0%).
The other respondents either did not remember how the discoveries
had been made, had never made these discoveries, or the circum-
stances of the discovery were unclassifiable.
RQ3 Which individual characteristics predict personal discovery? This
question was answered by means of logistic regression analysis. Demo-
graphics, photography-related orientations, and experience together
reached a Nagelkerke’s pseudo-R2 of .21 for predicting an individ-
ual user’s personal discovery. The orientations were found to be more
predictive than the experience-related factors. Technology cognizance
(see its operationalisation in Table 2.6) was the single most impor-
tant predictor, having the same importance as all of the experience-
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related factors put together. The minimal set of characteristics hav-
ing a predictive fit not statistically different from the best possible
model consisted of technology cognizance, gender (male), exploration-
orientation, use frequency for digital cameras, use tenure for digital
cameras, and income, in decreasing order of importance.
RQ4 Which individual characteristics predict long-term adoption of a re-
purposive appropriation? A sequential linear regression model ex-
plained 34% of the variance in adoption. The orientation and experi-
ence groups proved equally important, with R2 change = .20 and R2
change = .18, respectively. Here, use frequency for phone cameras,
orientation to technology cognizance, exploration-orientation, gender,
and use tenure for digital cameras were the variables with the best
prediction, again from greatest to least influence. This five-variable
model’s adjusted R2 was .32.
RQ5 Which type of discovery predicts adoption to long-term use? Personal
discovery had a small but positive effect (average Kendall’s τ corre-
lation: .28) on a creative use becoming part of the user’s permanent
use practice.
Therefore, given the answers to RQ3 and RQ4, the study indicated that
technology cognizance may be the single most important factor in both the
discovery and the adoption of creative uses. This thesis makes an assump-
tion that if respondents report that they have invested effort in learning
the functions of the technology, they have probably acquired a different un-
derstanding of the technology (i.e., technology cognizance) than the other
respondents have. This would imply that their mental representations of
the technology are different. Drawing conclusions about users’ mental rep-
resentations on the basis of their retrospective accounts is problematic,
however. This will be examined further in the summary of all the empirical
findings (Section 2.5).
Situations and processes of workaround appropriations
The Web-based survey study did not merely generate quantitative data,
however. The pilot studies (n = 33 and 25) preceding the final study
included two open-ended questions about situations and discovery processes
of repurposive appropriations. The participants provided 110 free-form
descriptions of their inventions of seven uncommon uses (the eighth use in
the final study – the periscope – was added after the pilots). Providing
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answers in these fields was optional. These open-ended questions were not
present in the final study, because asking respondents to answer them could
have proved too laborious. It was feared that many participants would have
lost interest in completing the questionnaire or would had provided only
very general answers had the open-ended questions been asked.
A qualitative content analysis (Silverman, 1993) of the contents carried
out by the author suggests several situational factors that can initiate a
repurposive appropriation process leading to discoveries of workarounds.
Table 2.7 shows these results. The ‘immediate need’ category was much
more heavily populated than the others, suggesting that, at least with
respect to digital cameras, most workaround-like appropriations are dis-
covered in the actual situations wherein the solutions are needed. While
the other categories feature fewer examples, they are still important, be-
cause they hint about a qualitatively different, more serendipitous discovery
mechanism. Accordingly, the situations that stimulate the workaround ap-
propriation described in Table 2.7 can be grouped into the following two
larger categories:
Bridging: The user notices a technological feature that presents a path
from the current situation to the goal state. In the data, often the
paths were very short, so the effectiveness could be immediately ap-
preciated. The repurposive appropriations belonging to ‘immediate
needs’ and ‘dormant needs’ were mostly bridgings.
Abduction: The user notices that interaction with a technology produces
an outcome or a side effect that is suitable for solving an unexpected
problem4. In the data, these were problems that had never faced
the user before. Repurposive appropriations resulting from abductive
reasoning could be found in the categories ‘playful exploration’, ‘cued
by design,’ and ‘accidental discovery’.
Importantly, both methods – bridging and abduction – are examples of
mapping. Mapping refers to a situation in which a person finds a solution
4In formal logic, abduction is an inference of the type ‘if p ⇒ q and q is true, then
p is also true’. This kind of reasoning is formally invalid, because it does not take into
account the possibility that q may hold for other reasons than p. Therefore, abduction
resembles guessing and hypothesis-building. It holds a central role especially in Peircean
pragmatism, in which it is used to describe the process of idea generation (Peirce, 1902,
paragraphs 188–189; Paavola, 2006). In this thesis, the term is used atheoretically,
without a theoretical commitment to Peirce’s writings or pragmatism. Rather, here it
denotes a situation in which the user, after observing an outcome, comes to imagine a
problem that this outcome would be able to solve.
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Table 2.7: Situations that give rise to workaround appropriations
Reason Freq. Example situation (what the situation was /
how the discovery was made)
Immediate
need
62 ‘I was shopping and was thinking at the same time
about what to cook for dinner. There was a
cookbook for sale in the shop. I looked up a
nice-looking (and simple) dish, and, because I didn’t
want to buy that book, I took a picture of the recipe.
Then I went around the shop, picking up the
ingredients with the picture as my guide, and cooked
the food at home.’ / ‘First, I felt bad because I
hadn’t taken a pen with me, but then I remembered
that my new phone had a camera and I decided to
try it.’ (Use as a note-taking tool)
Dormant
need
2 ‘I think it was in Antwerp and we had to find our
way back to the car, and I happened to notice a
stand with a map of the city.’ / ‘This just came to
mind as it also had happened that we had forgotten
the map in our car.’ (Use as a map)
Playful
exploration
6 ‘Drowsy on a Saturday afternoon’ / ‘I played with
my wife’s new phone; I set my grinning face as its
background image.’ (Use as a mirror)
Cued by
design
2 ‘The Sony Ericsson k700i has a small mirror right
under the lens, so I tried it right away when I played
with the phone the first time.’ (Use as a mirror; no
description of the situation was provided)
Accidental
discovery
2 ‘With a clamshell phone, it is irritatingly simple to
make a phone take a photo of you and see it on the
front display.’ / ‘I discovered this use because this
happens accidentally every week or even more often.’
(Use as a mirror)
Social
learning
4 ‘I was shopping for new eyeglasses.’ / ‘My sister




to a problem by recognising a pattern in the problem-solving situation that
fits a pattern in another, relevant piece of knowledge. This definition will
be refined further in the next chapter. Mapping helps the user discover
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the solution by finding a novel way of using technology for a present or
hypothetical problem (bridging and abduction, respectively).
These hypotheses are not without their problems, however. Here, the
thesis makes an assumption about users’ mental representations and cog-
nitive processes on the basis of retrospective self-report data. This leads
to the same validity-related limitations as in the Comeks study. As such,
respondents’ retrospective accounts of their repurposive appropriation pro-
cesses are unreliable sources of information on users’ cognitive processes.
In addition, although technology cognizance had the greatest predictive fit
with repurposive appropriation (RQ3) in the Web-based survey, it does not
necessarily follow that the actively appropriating people had really acquired
a better understanding of technology than the average users had. Both of
these conclusions require further empirical research. The theory that fol-
lows is based on the assumption that these hypotheses hold and will not
be refuted altogether later.
Table 2.7 also lists a ‘social learning’ category. However, since the focus
of this thesis is on individual users’ repurposive appropriation processes
and also the data have been gathered with that purpose, this category will
not be analysed further.
2.5 Implications for theory
Although the empirical works presented in this section were originally car-
ried out as separate self-contained studies, our analysis has pointed toward
three common implications. First, the field experiments with mGroup, Co-
Media, and Comeks presented how the features of the technology and the
environment affected the piecewise visual content creation processes. This
observation applied to all message creation situations generally. There-
fore, repurposive appropriation, as a special case of such content creation
processes, is affected by the same technological and environmental features.
Second, the Web-based survey provided hypotheses on antecedent factors of
repurposive appropriation and identified technology cognizance as the fac-
tor with the greatest significance in prediction. Third, the pilot studies for
the Web-based survey provided data on situational needs that give impetus
to repurposive appropriation. When the needs were grouped together, they
pointed to two qualitatively different repurposive appropriation processes
(bridging and abduction).
These implications are dealt with in the following sections.
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2.5.1 Repurposive appropriation requires adaptation to the
situational features
All of the empirical studies pointed out that the creation of a piece of
multimedia content (a message or a photograph) is affected both by the
visual material in the surroundings and by the features of the technology.
This can be modelled as follows. In piecewise visual content creation, the
user develops and maintains a plan for composing a piece of content, using
the environment and the features of the technology as resources. This
plan may need adaptation during the process, including also changes in the
purpose of the final content. The user adapts the plan on the basis of his
or her evaluation of the progress, suggestions provided by others, and his
or her observations of the environment.
For instance, during the process in which Eva created the film trailer
story (see Figure 2.7), she noticed that a picture of her friend hiding behind
a scarf made him look like a villain. This observation sparked a change in
her plan for the message’s narrative and led to further explorations and
adaptations of the plan. Similarly, in the example of playful exploration
with a digital camera that led to a repurposive appropriation (see Table
2.7), the respondent discovered the new use for a camera after initially
having in mind a plan to create a funny picture of himself. However, the
result – a grinning face – led him to think of using the camera as a mirror.
Here the original form for the content (an amusing image) was transformed
into a utility-oriented format, on the basis of interaction with the features
and from appreciation for the resulting image in the process.
Content creation therefore requires adaptation to the situation and at-
tention to its content creation opportunities. The elements of this process
are illustrated in Figure 2.8’s situated content creation process. It is reason-
able to assume that repurposive appropriations that arise within piecewise
visual content creation will also follow the mechanisms of the situated con-
tent creation process. The situational features that affect the process have
been given focus already in this section (e.g., in the classification of Table
2.2). Found in the above-mentioned figure’s bottom row, they are of four
types:
Working content: The piece of content that the user is creating in the
piecewise visual content creation task. Working content is typically
incomplete, and this incompleteness is an important source of prob-
lems that the user sets out to solve before being able to consider the
piece of content finished. Examples of working content in this chap-
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Figure 2.8: Situated content creation process. The underlined words denote
the related codes in Table 2.2.
ter’s studies are mobile multimedia messages, mobile comic strips,
and photos taken with a digital camera.
Technological features: Features that the user interacts with in order to
manipulate the working content. The technological features provide
both opportunities and constraints to the user with respect to the
content creation goal.
Environmental features: Features to do with the background of the ac-
tivity, including physical and digital properties that also provide op-
portunities and constraints affecting action for the use. Under the
classification in Table 2.2, these features also include other people,
if they only act as props and do not actively suggest changes to the
purpose or the composition of the piece of content. Environmental
features are usually at the periphery of the user’s attention unless a
problem emerges and the user starts to search for a solution, or a
serendipitous observation brings them to the focus of attention.
Suggestions from others: Actively expressed influences on the content
or its purpose, originating from other people.
These features and the situated content creation model will be used as
the foundation for a model of the repurposive appropriation process in the
next chapter.
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2.5.2 Two kinds of mappings underlie repurposive appro-
priations
Section 2.4 introduced two processes – bridging and abductive reasoning
– by which repurposive appropriations may be discovered. Bridging refers
to finding a match between the features of the current situation and the
surrounding resources, which aids in solving a problem or at least coming
closer to completion of a solution. Abduction, on the other hand, is trig-
gered by paying attention to something different from the ordinary. Both
processes are examples of mapping, which is one of the key concepts in the
psychology of problem-solving.
2.5.3 Repurposive appropriation depends on existing
knowledge
The third major finding from the empirical studies has to do with the
important role that users’ understanding of the technology appears to play
in repurposive appropriation. The study of digital camera use (see Section
2.4 and Paper 6) suggests that technology cognizance is the most important
factor explaining both the discovery and the adoption of creative uses. The
technology cognizance construct was composed of practices of studying the
features of the camera comprehensively, awareness of the connectivity of
the camera to other digital services and systems, and understanding of
the effects that different shooting settings have on the resulting image (see
Table 2.6 and Salovaara et al., 2011a, p. 2362).
2.6 Reliability and validity
The findings presented above stemmed from in situ observations of novel
communication technology use as well as self-report data from a Web-based
survey. In the absence of existing theory on individual users’ repurposive
appropriations, the research strategy (see Section 2.1) was to explore the
phenomenon from multiple angles, deliberately accepting the fact that some
parts of the resulting hypotheses do not have extensive empirical grounding.
The threats to reliability and validity are presented below.
2.6.1 Field experiments
The studies involving mGroup, CoMedia, and Comeks were planned so as
to maximise realism, with possible compromise between precision and gen-
eralisability. As for validity, the qualitative methods that were applied –
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technology interventions using in situ observation and periodic interviewing
– support good ecological validity and are suitable for this strategy, pro-
vided that the duration of the studies is long enough. An extended duration
increases the likelihood of observing normal user behaviour instead of only
experiences of first-day excitement. This requirement was met better as the
work progressed from one study to the next: from four days (mGroup) to
10 days, of which the last four were actively studied (CoMedia), to, finally,
nine weeks (Comeks).
With respect to reliability, researcher involvement always influences the
participants, especially when observation-based methods are applied (i.e.,
field experiments in HCI are easily subject to the Hawthorne effect; see
Adair, 1984 and also Brown et al., 2011). Also, participants may devi-
ate from the truth in their answers, not always deliberately so much as on
account of poor recall and unawareness of their cognitive processes (cf. Nis-
bett and Wilson, 1977). Much in these threats is dependent on the habitus
of the researcher as well as the extent to which he or she has treated the
participants with appreciation, winning their trust. In addition, partici-
pants in technology intervention studies are likely to feel obliged to use the
technology in question, for the sake of social desirability and politeness to
the researcher, thus causing higher-than-natural usage statistics. The same
applies to assessments of the quality of the technology.
In the studies of mGroup, CoMedia, and Comeks, it is indeed possible
that the participants used the systems more actively than would be nor-
mal and behaved in a contrived manner in order to present themselves in
a good light. However, the goal of the studies was not to evaluate sys-
tems’ acceptance and the associated user satisfaction but to learn about
emerging repurposive appropriations. This goal was never revealed to the
participants before the concluding interview. The focus on an aspect of
use other than acceptance increased the reliability of the studies, because
the participants were not aware of the true expectations of the researchers.
It is, however, possible that, because the participants were unable to in-
vent any uses for the systems, they tried them for multiple purposes only
to prove to researchers that they had at least done something with the
systems. Thus more repurposive appropriations may have emerged than
would have been natural. However, there were no signs pointing to this
occurring in the studies.
The main outcome from the three studies was the model of situated
content creation (Figure 2.8). It is unlikely that the researcher’s presence
or the short experiment durations would have biased this model, made it
incomplete, or populated it with the wrong elements.
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2.6.2 The Web-based survey
The Web-based survey study of digital cameras had a different set of threats
to validity and reliability. In Web-based surveys, problems with validity
arise in relation to the limitations of the data collection: the topic of inter-
est must be verbalisable and often formulated in easy-to-answer questions.
Therefore, Web-based surveys are rarely suitable for studying temporal
events, for example, or anything to do with physical action in any great de-
tail. The questions presented in surveys are frequently based on a research
model wherein there is an intention to investigate relationships between
individual variables. If the model is causal and contains independent and
dependent variables (as was the case with Paper 6), the causality is, in
fact, only a theoretical assumption; the data in isolation will be only cor-
relational. In this case, the validity depends on the validity of the model.
In the Web-based survey considered here, the research questions were
chosen so as to be verbalised and presented as forced-choice questions and
statements. The questions’ validity was improved through two pilot studies
and collection of peer critique from colleagues. However, explicit means for
ensuring the validity of the Web survey overall (e.g., methodological trian-
gulation; see Fielding and Fielding, 1986) were not employed. The validity
of individual theoretical constructs within the context of the questionnaire
was improved by means of exploratory factor analysis with attention to the
loadings.
As for reliability, Web-based surveys suffer from their reliance on retro-
spective self-report data whereas concurrently collected data would be more
reliable. There is always (see Czaja and Blair, 2005) a possibility that the
users (i) may not (or cannot) report what they really think, or are. They
(ii) may also answer by using idealisations, generalisations, or abstractions,
and they (iii) may provide false answers because of weak memories (Nisbett
and Wilson, 1977). All this may take place without an explicit intention
of being untruthful. Threat iii was addressed through asking the respon-
dents to report also how well they felt they remembered the moments when
they had discovered the purpose of use in question (see the tree-structured
questionnaire design in Paper 6, p. 2352).
Threats i and ii remain, however. The first was not addressed explicitly
in the study; this would have required methodological triangulation, which,
as stated above, was not part of the study’s design. With respect to threat
ii, it may be that in the course of filling in the survey’s first four pages, the
respondents constructed a self-image of themselves as photographers. This
could have affected respondents’ answers to Likert items on the question-
naire’s fifth page that addressed possible antecedent factors of repurposive
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appropriation. Active photographers may have presented themselves as
more proficient than they really are. However, post hoc tests of differences
in self-reported expertise (with levels of expertise ranging from novice to
professional, in four steps) revealed differences in neither discovery (RQ3)
nor adoption (RQ4) of workarounds (Paper 6). Therefore, while the threat
remains, the most straightforward analyses showed no signs of error.
Statistical analyses present their own threats to reliability, mostly re-
lated to tests that are unsuitable for the data. Paper 6 applied non-
parametric ordinal regression and variable dichotomisation in order to mit-
igate the U-shaped distribution of answers for the personal discovery vari-
able. The statements related to independent variables, in turn, were it-
erated over two pilot studies. In the analysis, the data were explored via
factor analyses and grouped within new constructs in cases in which Cron-
bach’s alphas did not yield acceptable levels and when the grouping was
theoretically motivated.
Finally, as mentioned above, the Web-based survey method brings its
own threats to reliability. One is a badly constructed sampling frame that
prevents true generalisability of the findings to the whole population. Pa-
per 6 justified the lack of a proper sampling frame with the fact that digital
cameras are an everyday technology for which the sampling frame would
cover the entire population of Finland. Probability sampling from such a
frame was impossible. The problems arising from self-selection convenience
sampling were compensated for by use of a large number of participants
(n = 2,379), which made it possible to perform analyses also of subsets of
data, this way addressing some of the threats in the post-study analysis
stage. Another Web-based-survey-specific threat is low respondent com-
mitment: respondents quickly lose interest in an Internet survey. With our
Web-based survey, this was countered with a prize draw for 15 gift cards
(worth 20 EUR each) from among the respondents who filled in the entire
questionnaire. The breakoff rate was 22%. There was no method of assess-
ing how the results would have changed had all respondents filled in the
questionnaire completely.
2.6.3 Implications of the studies
The implications presented in Section 2.5 can also be analysed for their
validity and reliability. For example, they can be too far-reaching, biased,
or invalid in some other ways. With respect to the model for piecewise
visual content creation (Subsection 2.5.1), a claim was made that repurpo-
sive appropriation would be bounded by the same factors as other content
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creation situations. It is possible that this claim may not hold. The pos-
sibility can only be addressed by subjecting the model to evaluation with
new empirical data in future research.
Subsection 2.5.2 suggests that discoveries of repurposive appropriations
will typically be prompted through two distinct kinds of cognitive pro-
cesses, both of which can be seen as mapping. This hypothesis receives
support from psychological literature in the following chapter. However,
confirmatory theoretical evidence does not satisfy the requirements of rig-
orous evaluation; that would necessitate comparison of the hypothesis with
competing theories, followed by an empirical evaluation. Such an evalua-
tion will not be provided in this thesis. Therefore, also this theoretical step
from data to theory will require future research.
In addition, while the studies presented here have led to a hypothesis
about mapping-based repurposive appropriations, that does not prove that
other cognitive processes leading to repurposive appropriations could not
exist. Further empirical research is needed for identification of additional
processes. However, exclusiveness of these two processes (i.e., their being
the only ones resulting in repurposive appropriations) was not actually
suggested in Subsection 2.5.2.
In Subsection 2.5.3, we claim that repurposive appropriation is depen-
dent on the user’s existing knowledge, and the more effort or time the user
has devoted to learning how the technology operates and can be used in
combination with other technologies, the more likely it is that the user ap-
propriates. This claim is based on the finding that technology cognizance
was the most important predicting variable for discovery of novel digital
camera uses. This claim, however, may not be valid with all technologies,
or the relation may not be as straightforward as the claim assumes.
Finally, the statistical support for technology cognizance’s overall im-
portance was rather tentative. The pseudo-R2 value for the research
model’s predictive capacity for the personal discovery variable was rather
low (.21). Removing technology cognizance from the set of predictors re-
duced the pseudo-R2 by only .03, to .18. However, this decline was larger
than what resulted from removal of all variables of use tenure (measured in
years) and use frequency of different camera types (six variables in total).
Therefore, while the hypothesis of the importance of technology cognizance
is tentative and it appears that many additional factors remain to be uncov-
ered, it is nonetheless a stronger component than any other factors studied.
This thesis takes a deliberate risk here by adopting the assumption that
technology cognizance plays a significant role in repurposive appropriation.
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop starting points for a cogni-
tive theory of repurposive appropriation. Given this exploratory goal, the
threats to validity are not as critical as they would be in theory-testing,
for example. In this case, the coherence of the theoretically oriented hy-
potheses and their compatibility with empirical findings are the central
criteria for validity. The next chapter shows how the findings from all of
the empirical studies when considered together can be integrated into co-
herent theoretical hypotheses addressing cognitive processes of repurposive
appropriation.




This chapter takes the previous section’s theoretical implications as a start-
ing point for exploration of a cognitive theory of repurposive appropriation.
The chapter starts by presenting a model for repurposive appropriation and
substantiates it with knowledge from relevant fields in psychology and cog-
nitive science. These elaborations are summarised at the end of the chapter
as starting points for a theory of repurposive appropriation. In contrast to
the previous chapter, which was based on data from empirical case studies
(Papers 1, 2, 3, and 6), this chapter draws from existing literature. The
goal is to work toward a theory for individual repurposive appropriation.
Because the material for the theory development in this part of the work is
not empirical in nature, no empirical evaluation of the theory will be pre-
sented either. However, Section 3.5 provides suggestions for such research
designs.
Figure 3.1 presents a model that is directly based on the situated piece-
wise visual content creation model of the previous chapter (i.e., Figure
2.8). There are two differences between the previous chapter’s model and
the present one. First, the class ‘suggestions from others’ has been omitted
from the situational features. While the previous model described the situ-
ational influences of piecewise visual content creation generally, the model
shown here has to do with repurposive appropriation by an individual user.
As defined in Table 2.2, suggestions denote recommendations made by oth-
ers regarding the purpose or composition of the content. Therefore, because
this thesis focuses on the discoveries of an individual, solutions provided by
other people through suggestions will be omitted. However, in a parallel
with Table 2.2, the influences from other people, as long as they are not
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Figure 3.1: The cognitive process of repurposive appropriation in piecewise
visual content creation. A hypothetical user solves the problems in creation
of a piece of content by mapping situational features of the setting (bot-
tom) to her existing knowledge of possible content creation solutions (top),
representing her solution attempt in the working schema (SW ). She may
discover a novel use for the technologies if the resultant mapping is novel.
direct suggestions to repurpose the technology, remain in the model as a
sub-class of environmental situational features.
The second difference from the previous chapter’s model is that Figure
3.1 applies cognitive terminology in the model. Piecewise visual content
creation is seen as a problem-solving process in which the user’s problem is
to find a satisfying composition for the working content (e.g., an unfinished
message). In order to succeed in this, the user applies the features of the
environment and technologies while also interactively consulting existing
knowledge in the course of the search for a satisfying configuration.
In short, the model suggests that repurposive appropriation is based on
processing of mental representations (denoted with M and S in the figure).
They are both the user’s interpretations of the external features (F ) and
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pieces of knowledge in his or her memory about issues that are relevant
in content creation (e.g., compositional alternatives and methods by which
content can be manipulated).
When creating a piece of content, the user adapts (see Subsection 2.5.1)
to the situational features through a mapping process. The model suggests
three distinct types of mapping. The first one (recognition from the envi-
ronment) refers to finding a set of correspondences between the situational
features and the user’s representation of a possible solution. The second and
third type (i.e., analogy through problem abstraction and analogy between
tools, respectively) use the same definition for mapping as the literature
on analogical problem-solving. There, mapping is defined as a process in
which a person establishes ‘a set of systematic correspondences that serve
to align the elements of the source and target’ (Holyoak, 2005, pp. 117–118)
analogs.
The ongoing problem-solving solution is represented in an unfinished
working schema (SW ). It ties together the situational features’ (F ) rep-
resentations (M) and a description of the problem. The three mapping
processes change SW in different ways. SW may become one of the exist-
ing solution schemas (S) if the problem-solving is completed successfully.
Solution schemas represent known ways to carry out tasks. They are large
network-like mental representations.
The situational features (F ), in turn, are properties of the working
content, the environment, and the technologies. The user can interact
with these features in the problem-solving process. Only a subset of these
features is known to the user, and of these features, only a few are attended
to when the user solves a problem. In Figure 3.1, the unattended and
unknown features are visualised as F s that do not have Ms linked to them.
This chapter first presents the ontological premises behind the model
(Section 3.1) and then addresses each of Figure 3.1’s components in turn:
situational features (Section 3.2), mapping (Section 3.3), and existing
knowledge (Section 3.4). In the final part of the chapter, Section 3.5 ad-
dresses what is necessary for turning the model into a theory of repurposive
appropriation.
3.1 Premises
The model rests on two ontological premises. First, it is assumed that
repurposive appropriation is based on processing of symbolic mental rep-
resentations. Second, it is assumed that the outcomes of this processing
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– the appropriations – are also represented as complex mental representa-
tions that describe how situational features can be manipulated to solve
problems. These premises are presented in the following two subsections.
3.1.1 Repurposive appropriation as processing of symbolic
representations
Two competing representation-related frameworks are available for explain-
ing repurposive appropriation processes. As is evident from Figure 3.1,
this thesis suggests that discoveries need to be explained with theories of
problem-solving and processing of symbolic representations. This will be
referred to as the symbolic viewpoint. Its competitor will be termed the
non-representational viewpoint.
A competing hypothesis: The non-representational viewpoint
From the non-representational viewpoint, one would explain repurposive
appropriation without a reference to symbolic processing and suggest direct
interaction with the physical surroundings. This viewpoint belongs to a
class of theories referred to here as the situated viewpoint. We describe this
first.
The situated viewpoint does not form a completely coherent and non-
contradictory paradigm for cognition, but an outline of its explanation for
repurposive appropriation can be presented as follows. From this view-
point, when a user carries out tasks that are familiar, he or she is not
consciously aware of the interaction with the tools and the object of ac-
tivity. Instead, the tools are, in Heidegger’s terms, ‘ready-to-hand’, and
their use is unproblematic. In situations such as that of repurposive ap-
propriation, unproblematic interaction is interrupted and the tools become
‘present-at-hand’, invoking processes of planning and sensemaking of the
situation (cf. Winograd and Flores, 1986).
At this point, the different theories applying the situated viewpoint di-
verge in their opinions as to the role of symbolic representations in human
behaviour. One opinion is that humans may switch temporarily to a sym-
bolic mode and generate internal representations of problematic situations
and plans. The plan may serve as a resource for further actions, which again
are carried out in direct interaction with the environment (Suchman, 1987).
This alternative therefore does not deny the role of symbolic representations
in human behaviour altogether. However, it shows how representations are
dependent on the circumstances in which they are invoked. The thesis is
intended to be in line with this formulation of the situated viewpoint.
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The alternative, the non-representational viewpoint, in contrast, states
that internal representations, planning, and use of symbolic representations
are unnecessary theoretical constructs (e.g., Brooks, 1991; Varela et al.,
1993). Many factors are behind the non-representational viewpoint’s re-
jection of the hypothesis as to the existence of symbolic representations.
For example, a number of artificial intelligence systems have been devel-
oped that do not have representational states yet nevertheless exhibit in-
telligent behaviour. Hence, it seems that representations are not neces-
sary for intelligent action, which raises the possibility that representations
may not be needed in other explanations of cognitive activities either (van
Gelder, 1998). Second, mental representations appear to be uneconomical:
if an agent has an opportunity to use the world as its model, why would
there be a complicated mechanism that translates observations into sym-
bolic form before any intelligent behaviour becomes possible (Beer, 2003;
Brooks, 1991)? Third, representation-based systems have been claimed to
exhibit poor performance. Early work on artificial intelligence showed that
intelligent robots relying on representations often failed to solve real-world
problems because their internal models of the environment were brittle
and lacked robustness in the face of changing circumstances. Also, many
real-world problems are intractable and, because of their size, cannot be
represented with a problem space (e.g., Agre and Chapman, 1987). These
are a few of the reasons for which some researchers of artificial intelligence
and philosophy have rejected the existence of symbolic representations in
human cognition.
At most, these theorists argue, the theories of action and perception
should be based on sensorimotor representations (e.g., van Gelder, 1998;
Thelen and Smith, 1994). To explain human behaviour with represen-
tations, the non-representational viewpoint states that the user uses the
external world directly as his or her model. The physical properties of the
world provide affordances for action that are perceived directly, without
interpretation (Gibson, 1979).
A non-representational theory can be used to explain some repurposive
appropriations. For instance, when a user encounters a need to keep a door
open, she may perceive that a screwdriver can be stuck between the door
and the door frame. In this case, by its shape and movability, the screw-
driver affords its remaining in that position. This results in repurposive
appropriation of a screwdriver as a door-stopper. Some theorists suggest
that human cognition should be based on theories of this type of direct
interaction with the environment (e.g., Brooks, 1991).
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Shapiro summarises the claims in the following definition:
Definition 2 (Argument for representational scepticism).
1. Representations are stand-ins for actual objects.
2. An agent is in continuous contact with the objects with which it needs
to interact.
3. If an agent is in continuous contact with the objects with which it needs
to interact, it doesn’t require stand-ins for these objects.
Therefore, an agent has no need for representational states that stand-in
for actual objects. (Shapiro, 2011, p. 150)
Repurposive appropriation is, however, a phenomenon that cannot be
explained fully without a reference to mental representations. The non-
representational viewpoint could possibly be defendable if one were to focus
only on repurposive appropriations that are discovered in the face of an im-
mediate need and that involve perceptions of physical properties (as in the
screwdriver example above). It could then be that interactive technologies’
functions could be explored directly, without internal symbolic representa-
tions. But the non-representational viewpoint cannot be maintained when
other kinds of repurposive appropriations are considered. First, the discov-
eries resulting from dormant needs (see Table 2.7) take place in situations
in which the user is not in continuous contact with all of the features that
are needed for a successful solution to a problem. Therefore, the user must
have had a memory (i.e., an internal representation) of the technology and
other features, in order to notice the opportunity for a novel technology
use.
Second, also during continuous interaction, some users appear to be bet-
ter than others at discovering novel opportunities for action. A plausible
explanation is that the more actively appropriating users have capabilities
that the other users do not. Paper 6 suggests that the most feasible ex-
planation lies in the difference in knowledge (i.e., technology cognizance)
of the technological features and their effect. Much of that knowledge is
symbolic; it is not directly observable in the world.
It is, therefore, more likely that the user processes symbolic mental rep-
resentations in repurposive appropriation. As a result, this thesis subscribes
to the situated viewpoint but not in its non-representational form.
The symbolic viewpoint
The conclusion that repurposive appropriation is probably based on symbol
processing implies that this thesis subscribes to the so-called physical sym-
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bol system hypothesis of human cognition (Newell and Simon, 1976; Newell,
1980; Vera and Simon, 1993) in its explanation for repurposive appropri-
ation. According to this hypothesis, intelligent action can only be based
on processing of symbols (Newell and Simon, 1976) and, secondly, these
symbols and their processing can be implemented physically. The human
brain is said to be an example of such a physical system1.
The symbol system hypothesis that is subscribed to here follows the
one presented by Vera and Simon (1993), who emphasise that symbolic
representations can be unconscious and operate also at low levels of the
cognitive architecture (e.g., as commands for muscles; cf. p. 18). The
thesis, therefore, does not assume that representations would be encoded
in an inner, symbol-like ‘language of thought’ (cf. Fodor, 1975). Consistent
with Vera and Simon’s hypothesis, the hypothesis here is that in repurpo-
sive appropriation, perceptions of the features (denoted with F in Figure
3.1) of the surrounding world are processed and represented as symbols,
which, in turn, are used in information processing. Similarly, the existing
knowledge too is symbolically represented. However, as will be shown in
the discussion that follows, the model presented in this chapter does not
require that symbolic representations be processed without interaction with
the surrounding environment. On the contrary, the suggestion is that in
repurposive appropriation, the situational features and the existing knowl-
edge interact with each other in the mapping process.
1However, the brain is also a connectionistic sub-symbolic system. Research-based
knowledge of how symbolic representations are implemented in the brain is still tentative
and inconclusive (e.g., Doumas and Hummel, 2005; Eysenck and Keane, 2000). Detail-
ing how even simple pieces of propositional knowledge (e.g., generic templates such as
eats(cat,fish)) can be implemented neurally has been theoretically challenging, al-
though progress has been made (e.g., Doumas and Hummel, 2005; Botvinick and Plaut,
2004). For repurposive appropriation, the symbolic–connectionistic models that address
perceptions, actions, and symbols are especially promising. These include Barsalou’s
theories of perceptual symbol systems (1999) and realisation of representations as neural
simulators of the external object (2009), as well as Hommel et al.’s theory of event coding
(2001), which also suggests that perception and action are based on the same represen-
tational neural medium. The problem of neural implementation of symbolic representa-
tions is not pursued extensively in this thesis (however, see Section 4.2, on computational
simulations of repurposive appropriation). As was discussed above, explaining repurpo-
sive appropriation without committing ontologically to symbolic representations leads to
problems. Repurposive appropriation is a ‘representation-hungry’ (Clark, 1997) problem
that theories advocating representational scepticism cannot explain.
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3.1.2 Repurposive appropriation as creation of solution
schemas
The second premise is that as an outcome of repurposive appropriation,
the user learns new symbolic representations of technology use that can
be described as networks of representations, already referred to as solution
schemas. The following example of an authentic repurposive appropriation
concretises this suggestion. One of the respondents in the Web-based survey
(see Paper 6) described her discovery of a digital camera as a note-taking
tool as follows (presented already in Table 2.7, on p. 60):
Question: What was the situation like? ‘I was shopping and
was thinking at the same time about what to cook for dinner.
There was a cookbook for sale in the shop. I looked up a nice-
looking (and simple) dish, and, because I didn’t want to buy
that book, I took a picture of the recipe. Then I went around
the shop, picking up the ingredients with the picture as my
guide, and cooked the food at home.’
Question: How was the discovery made? ‘First, I felt bad be-
cause I hadn’t taken a pen with me, but then I remembered
that my new phone had a camera and I decided to try it.’
In the terminology of Figure 3.1’s model, the mental processes behind
this discovery may have been the following. The quotation contains a se-
quence of three solution attempts, of which the third was successful and also
contained a repurposive appropriation. These solution attempts involved
different mappings, depicted in Figure 3.2. The problem-solving proceeded
from a need to come up with a plan for dinner. The user recognised that
she could look up a recipe in a cookbook that is sold in the shop. This cre-
ated the content creation problem of storing the recipe somehow for later
retrieval. The respondent’s first working schema was initially mapped to
an already known solution schema: purchase of the book. However, the
respondent did not find this solution successful, because she did not want
to spend money on the book. The second version of the working schema
too was mapped to an existing solution: using pen and paper (mentioned
in the ‘how’ part of the answer). However, this working solution was unsuc-
cessful because the respondent did not find a pen. Finally, the respondent
created a working schema with a novel mapping, based on recognition that
a feature of another technology – the camera phone – was also suitable


































Figure 3.2: Three solutions for storing for later use a recipe in a cook-
book that is for sale in a shop. Dotted lines represent features that were
unavailable or deemed undesireable, leading to unsuccessful solutions.
it mapped the solution to features that were available in the situation at
hand.
The three diagrams in Figure 3.2 illustrate a suggestion as to how re-
purposive appropriation can be understood as creation of a novel solution
schema. This schema maps the given situational features and one or more
actions to a description of how the desired change in the physical world or
a digital environment can be achieved. These diagrams are simplifications;
their purpose is to illustrate mapping, not to suggest that this respondent’s
solution schemas in reality would have had exactly the structures that are
shown. Also, although they present only single-action solutions (e.g., ‘pur-
chase the book’), this does not mean that solution schemas would not
contain also sequences of action.
The structure of solution schemas
Solution schemas, by linking different elements together, are complex men-
tal representations. They are similar to frames (Minsky, 1975), scripts
(Schank and Abelson, 1977), memory organisation packets (Schank, 1982),
and templates (Gobet and Simon, 1996), all of which are concepts presented
in the literature for describing complex mental organisations of knowledge.
Such representations share the property that they can be expressed as re-
lational propositional networks (e.g., Paivio, 1990, p. 30).
More precise suggestion than this cannot be made as to the structure
of solution schemas. The only feasible requirement is that these schemas
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would have a mapping-like structure in (i) linking situational features to-
gether and (ii) representing actions that operate on these elements. Psy-
chological literature has established that mental representations can be
divided into procedural and declarative representations (e.g., McNamara,
1994; Eysenck and Keane, 2000). Procedural representations refer to knowl-
edge of how tasks and actions are carried out, while declarative represen-
tations refer to knowledge that can be verbalised, visualised, or declared in
some other way (McNamara, 1994, p. 86). Within declarative knowledge,
the main dividing line is between analogical and symbolic representations
(or visual and verbal representations; see Paivio, 1990). Analogical rep-
resentations preserve the structure of the object that they represent (e.g.,
what a camera looks like). Symbolic representations have to do with in-
formation that does not have physical dimensions or a visual form (e.g.,
the rules for deciding when to use the flash when taking a photograph).
Solution schemas appear to have characteristics of both procedural and
declarative representations.
Interaction with the situational features
Solution schemas and situational features (see the next section) are in close
interaction. On one hand, features provide possibilities for serendipitous
novel mappings that give rise to new solution schemas. On the other hand,
solution schemas direct the user’s attention to features in the environment.
Schön (1983) has called these reciprocal interactive problem-solving actions
move-testing experiments. With moves, the problem-solver makes attempts
to frame the problem-solving situation. With tests, he or she verifies the
assumptions. It has been found that interactiveness helps the solver both
(i) make important observations and (ii) evaluate the assumptions he or
she has made (Weller et al., 2011).
These two possible outcomes of move-testing – observation-making and
evaluation – are similar to the stages in Norman’s action cycle (1988), which
presents humans’ interactions with the world as alternation of execution
and evaluation. In Norman’s model, however, observation-making is de-
emphasised.
When Schön’s and Norman’s descriptions of interaction are con-
sidered together, they create a three-part cycle consisting of observa-
tion/perception, execution/action, and evaluation/learning. Such a cycle
was presented in Paper 4, based on Neisser’s perceptual cycle. The two
models are presented graphically in Figure 3.3. In the cycle shown on

















Figure 3.3: Neisser’s (1976) perceptual cycle (left) and its adaptation (mod-
ified from work in Paper 4) for describing repurposive appropriation (right).
environment, including the technologies. The user applies (i.e., performs
actions on) suitable features of the technology. If they prove beneficial and
are novel, the user’s understanding of the feature’s possible uses will change
(i.e., the user learns).
The focus in this chapter is on the cognitive processes represented by
the arrow labelled ‘Directs’ that leads from working schema to exploration.
This means that both the verification of one’s perception through action
and the changes that the verification causes in the existing schemas are not
addressed in this thesis. Consequently, longer-term processes that involve
multiple cycles are not addressed either. This limitation of scope is justified
for two reasons. First, generating hypotheses for even one part of the cycle
involves many hypotheses already, any or all of which may prove to be
untrue. Addressing the full cycle, or multiples cycles, could introduce more
serious errors. The choice to focus on perceptual processes within a cycle
is justified by its similarity to discovery, which is the primary event in
repurposive appropriation (see the definition in Subsection 1.2.1, p. 32).
With the foundation on symbolic representations now established, the
following sections describe Figure 3.1’s elements in more detail and present
three suggestions for mapping processes to explain cognitive processes be-
hind repurposive appropriation.
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3.2 Situational features
Situational features constitute the bottom box in Figure 3.1. The defini-
tions of the three types of features – working content, technologies, and
environment – are those already provided in Subsection 2.5.1. The features
include all constraints and opportunities for solving the problem, such as
the functions of the present technologies, the physical properties of both
the technologies and the environment, and social elements such as other
people. This set of features is limitless, because it depends on the user and
his or her specific situation. Some of these features are situation-dependent
(e.g., lighting conditions for photography), while others are more perma-
nent (e.g., the ability of a camera phone to take pictures).
In line with the physical symbol system hypothesis, those features that
the user knows about, interacts with, or attends to during piecewise vi-
sual content creation are processed via their mental representations. These
mental representations constitute the elements that the user finds relevant
(or apperceives; cf. Saariluoma and Kalakoski, 1998) in his or her present
interaction in the piecewise visual content creation process. The represen-
tations contain declarative knowledge of what the features are (e.g., what
a camera’s various flash settings do) but also the user’s predictions of their
effect on the present task. The representations are not static; they can
change, depending on the user’s assessment of the ongoing progress of the
task.
3.3 Mapping-based repurposive appropriation
processes
Mapping is the middle element in Figure 3.1. This section presents the
following three suggestions for mapping processes:
• Recognition of solutions from the environment on the basis of map-
ping of solution schemas to the situational features (Subsection 3.3.1).
• Analogical problem-solving-based repurposive appropriations. Intro-
duction to these suggestions is provided in Subsection 3.3.2.
– Analogical mapping through problem generalisation (Subsection
3.3.3).
– Analogical mapping between tools (Subsection 3.3.4).
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These suggestions imply that not all repurposive appropriations can be
explained by a single cognitive process. The following sections first present
the mappings based on recognition of solutions from the environment’s
structures and continue with an introduction to analogical problem-solving
and a presentation of two, different analogy-based mapping processes.
3.3.1 Recognition of solutions from the environment
Most technology use takes place in human-built dedicated environments
that provide a lot of structure and explicit information that guide and ori-
ent people in their activities (cf. Alterman et al., 1998; Hutchins, 1995a;
Kirsh, 1995, 2001; Norman, 1988). With experience, people become at-
tuned (Kirsh, 2009) to such structures. Repurposive appropriations may
be discovered via perception of such structures. These structures represent
partial solution schemas, which are mappings of situational features, their
relations, and actions that can be carried out on them but lack problems
for which these structures can serve as solutions. Repurposive appropria-
tion may result if a person discovers such a problem and if the complete
solution schema involves a novel use of one of the tools. This would explain
the process behind abductive appropriations and discoveries of solutions
to dormant needs (see Table 2.7) – repurposive appropriations in which
the discovery appears to take place serendipitously, without an immediate
consciously attended problem. Findings from studies of distributed cog-
nition (DCog) and situated cognition (SCog) provide background for this
hypothesis.
Distributed and situated cognition
The basic premise underlying both DCog and SCog is that cognitive activity
is carried out not only in the brain but also in the user’s environment.
The two frameworks have a lot of overlap. However, research on DCog
often focuses on the use of tools in cognitive activities such as calculation
and planning while SCog is a more general framework encompassing many,
quite different viewpoints and commitments with respect to the mind–body
boundary (e.g., Robbins and Aydede, 2009, pp. 3–10). For the purpose of
this thesis, it is useful to present DCog as studies of information processing
in systems that distribute the computation effort across different actors
(both humans and tools; e.g., Hollan et al., 2000; Hutchins, 1995a,b; Rogers,
1993) and SCog as studies of the use of physical environment as cues and
reminders about actions (e.g., Alterman et al., 1998; Kirsh, 1995, 2009).
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Studies of DCog have analysed, for instance, ship navigation (before
GPS devices became widespread). The ship’s captain and the crew use a
number of specialist tools (e.g., alidade, hoey, record log, and chart) on
the command deck to track the route of the ship (Hutchins, 1995a). The
navigation includes tasks such as finding out where the ship is positioned
on a map, what its speed is, and where it is heading. Completion of these
tasks is distributed across a number of agents, consisting of both humans
and tools. The analysis of the system’s processes focuses on the propagation
of a representational state across a series of representational media (ibid.,
p. 117). This framework is oriented to analysing distributed information
processing, often in routinised tightly coupled activities between/among
multiple agents. In itself, it would not be a sufficient basis for a theory
of individual repurposive appropriation, which would have to focus also on
actions that are not aimed at computation only.
SCog’s studies of external representations and use of physical space as
an organiser of activities complement DCog’s main findings and are highly
relevant for a theory of repurposive appropriation. The physical space
provides entry points that invite initiation of actions (Kirsh, 2001) and
simplify choices and perception. Also, as already mentioned, tools save
on human actors’ internal computation (Hutchins, 1995a; Kirsh, 1995). In
contributing to activities in these ways, the physical space and the tools be-
come external representations of the problem and its constraints, relations,
rules, and other problem-solving-relevant properties (Zhang and Norman,
1994; Zhang, 1997; Wright et al., 2000; Scaife and Rogers, 1996). During
problem-solving, the solver may also interact with the physical space in
order to gather more information about the problem. These actions are
called epistemic actions (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). They do not move the
solver closer to the goal but produce information that helps him or her in
further problem-solving steps (see Kirsh, 2009 for a review).
Application to repurposive appropriation
When a user appropriates by recognising structure in the environment, he
or she notices an opportunity for using a technology in a novel manner
by mapping a partial solution schema presented by the environment to
the working schema of his or her ongoing problem. This can happen (i)
in a situation that resembles problem-solving (where the goal also affects
the user’s attention to situational features) or (ii) abductively (where a
technology produces an outcome that catches the user’s attention and the
user then maps this outcome to a hypothetical problem). Figure 3.4 depicts
this mapping.















Figure 3.4: Repurposive appropriation through recognition of a partial so-
lution schema (Spartial) and subsequent mapping of it to a problem (Mp)
that it can solve.
The studies presented in this thesis (see the previous chapter) have
not provided empirical examples of type i on a sufficient level, but the
extended quotation of a message creation process from the Comeks study
(Section 2.3, pp. 51–53) contains multiple examples of changes with type
ii. There, the changes in the message’s purpose (e.g., to a decision to have
an secret-agent film theme in the story) may have resulted from mappings
in which the structures perceived in the environment were sources for new
representations to do with the message’s possible compositions.
Recognition of solution schemas resembles symbolic pattern recognition
in that the situational features that the person has noticed first combine
into patterns, which, in turn, become meaningful through their connections
to the user’s previous knowledge. Such a recognition of solution schemas is
similar to the processes of retrieval and recognition studied in psychological
memory research (e.g., the model of associative memory; see Raaijmakers
and Siffrin, 1981). Situational features therefore serve as memory cues
that lead to recognition of previous memories of similar situations. Section
4.2 discusses how the recognition of schemas could be implemented in a
computational model.
Thus existing knowledge (discussed in more length in Section 3.4) plays
an important role in repurposive appropriation. Both the repository of al-
ready known solution schemas and general technological understanding help
the person perceive more entry points for action in his or her environment.
The more familiar a user is with the technology, the more opportunities
and cues that user sees for using it (Kirsh, 2009; Greeno and the Middle
School Mathematics Through Applications Project Group, 1998). Percep-
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tion is therefore affected by the user’s representation of the problem with
the current working content and his or her background knowledge.
3.3.2 Introduction to analogical problem-solving-based
mapping
The remaining two repurposive appropriation processes suggested are based
on analogical problem-solving. This section provides the necessary back-
ground for these suggestions.
In psychology, ‘problem’ refers to a situation in which ‘an organism has
a goal but lacks a clear or well-learned route to the goal’ (Dominowski and
Bourne, 1994, p. 23). In workaround-related repurposive appropriation,
the problem that the user faces is that a means to move forward towards
the goal is not available (cf. p. 15, footnote). Research on problem-solving
has identified multiple methods via which people start solving problems.
Weak and strong problem-solving methods
Problem-solving methods belong to two categories, according to whether
the user applies expert knowledge about the domain and the tools in the
problem-solving process. Weak methods are knowledge-lean techniques that
can be applied in many domains but that may not always lead to a solution.
Problem-solving using weak methods is also typically slow. These methods
include general heuristics (e.g., trial and error) as well as algorithms, most
importantly hill-climbing and means–ends reasoning.
In problems that are relatively free of specialised content and in which
there is a clear goal, means–ends analysis is usually the method that solvers
adopt most often (Novick and Bassok, 2005). In means–ends analysis, the
solver analyses the difference between the present state and the goal state,
and he or she identifies a sub-goal that is easier to resolve than the full
problem and that will bring him or her closer to the overall goal. Then the
user sets out to reach this sub-goal. Once done, he or she identifies the next
sub-goal minimising the gap that remains. This will be continued until the
full problem is solved. Alternatively, if a sub-goal is too difficult to reach
directly, the user will divide it recursively into sub-subgoals (Newell and
Simon, 1972).
Strong methods, in contrast, make use of the solver’s expert knowledge
of the problem domain. These therefore guide the solver to the goal more
quickly. The cost of this benefit, however, is that the knowledge of suitable
solutions is often specialised and does not transfer well to other problem
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Table 3.1: Stages in solving a problem (Weisberg, 2006a, p. 179)
Stage 1: Solution through application of strong methods
1. Problem presented ⇒ attempt to match with knowledge
(a) No solution available ⇒ Stage 2
(b) Successful match with knowledge ⇒ transfer solution based on exper-
tise or analogy
(c) If solution transfers successfully ⇒ problem solved
(d) If solution fails ⇒ Stage 2
Comment: If no match is found with the memory, the person proceeds to Stage
2; if match is made, solution is attempted. Can result in solution of the problem.
Stage 2: Solution through direct application of weak methods
2. Failure at Stage 1a ⇒ analysis based on weak methods
(a) Analysis successful ⇒ solution
(b) No solution ⇒ impasse; problem not solvable
Comment: Person works through problem using weak heuristic methods, trying
to develop solution; if successful, problem is solved.
domains (Feltovich et al., 2006). In Figure 3.1, known solution schemas
(Ss) represent the strong methods of which the user is aware.
Typically, both weak and strong methods are used when one is solving
novel problems. Table 3.1 presents Weisberg’s model of stages in a problem-
solving process. The solver first tries to apply existing knowledge to the
problem and solve it by using strong methods. If that is not possible, weak
methods will be applied to the task.
Repurposive appropriation as creative problem-solving
A user who appropriates and finds a novel purpose of use for a technology
discovers, in so doing, something new about the technology and its rela-
tionship to a context of use. All problem-solving – including repurposive
appropriation – is therefore creative, because it leads to knowledge that the
solver had not previously possessed.
Psychological research on creative problem-solving presents two com-
peting views for explaining creative cognitive processes. This thesis sub-
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scribes to the so-called ordinary thinking viewpoint (Weisberg, 2006a), from
which creative problem-solving can be explained with the same theories as
ordinary thinking, in this case when one draws from theories of analogical
mapping. The competing viewpoint – based on Gestalt psychology – is
reviewed next.
Competing hypothesis: Gestalt problem-solving
The Gestalt theory of creativity (cf. Duncker, 1945; Dominowski, 1995)
suggests that creative thinking requires the person to discard previous
knowledge before being able to reach novel insights. The theory makes
a distinction between reproductive thinking (i.e., routine thinking with
no insights) and productive thinking (i.e., creative problem-solving) and
maintains that these two kinds of thinking are based on different cognitive
processes (e.g., Wertheimer, 1959). When a person faces a problem that
can only be solved creatively, he or she usually first experiences an impasse.
The reason behind the impasse lies in fixation on applying existing knowl-
edge to the problem. A person at this juncture will be able to solve the
problem only by discarding or reframing the assumptions that block him
or her from noticing other solutions and restructuring the problem repre-
sentation (Ohlsson, 1992). When the restructuring takes place, it yields a
sudden experience of insight.
The concept of fixation plays a central role in problem-solving research
in Gestalt tradition. One source for fixations is the cues in the problem
setting. Another source, importantly for repurposive appropriation, is the
solver’s previous knowledge. A Gestalt explanation for repurposive appro-
priation would suggest that the cues and the person’s knowledge would lead
the solver to fixate on a subset of characteristics of the problem, leading
away from a solution by blocking the solver from seeing other alternatives
(e.g., Smith, 1995).
Some non-Gestalt theories considering the creative process maintain
a similar view and suggest that a creative solution can be found only if
the solver breaks free from previously held views. The cognitive processes
suggested as able to make this happen include lateral thinking (De Bono,
1970); generation of many alternatives, from which the bad candidates are
then filtered out (Finke et al., 1992); and blind variation and selective
retention (Campbell, 1960).
However, these theories and Gestalt psychology have two problems when
applied for explaining repurposive appropriation. First, the existing empiri-
cal data on repurposive appropriation processes have not provided evidence
3.3. Mapping-based repurposive appropriation processes 89
(e.g., in the stories collected in the Web-based survey study; see Section 2.4)
that impasses and non-productive problem representations usually precede
repurposive appropriation. Second, more importantly, existing knowledge,
on a large scale, does not appear to have a negative effect on repurposive
appropriation. The opposite – that existing knowledge supports repurpo-
sive appropriation – seems to be more likely. One of the findings from
the Web-based survey study was that repurposive appropriation is more
commonplace among those users who stated that they put effort into de-
veloping a good understanding of technology. This finding holds at least
on a general level. However, functional fixedness may still manifest itself
in more narrowly defined technology use domains, although this is yet to
be shown.
Another important claim in Gestalt theory on problem-solving is that
insight problems can only be solved through restructuring (e.g., Köhler,
1969; for a brief summary regarding claims, see also Weisberg and Alba,
1981) of the problem representation. The idea of a changing problem rep-
resentation is not unique to Gestalt psychology, however. Other problem-
solving research approaches too (e.g., analogical problem-solving; see be-
low) maintain that problem-solving involves discovery of new solution
strategies and problem representations. This part of Gestalt theory is un-
problematic for theorising related to repurposive appropriation.
In conclusion, the unique parts of the Gestalt viewpoint are poorly
suited to explaining repurposive appropriation. Therefore, this thesis pro-
ceeds from a premise of ordinary thinking in problem-solving.
Analogical problem-solving
In some situations, when facing a problem during an activity, the user may
become aware of another technology that would be suitable for the task but
that is unavailable at present. With this awareness, the user may be able to
overcome the problem by using a tool that resembles the already known tool
in relevant ways. Analogical problem-solving is suggested as an explanation
for such discoveries. The definition of an analogy is that ‘two situations
are analogous if they share a common pattern of relationships among their
constituent elements even though the elements themselves differ across two
situations’ (Holyoak, 2005, p. 117). The types of situations for which this
explanation may be best suited are the repurposive appropriations arising
from immediate needs and dormant needs (i.e., the situations in which the
user has faced or is facing a problem; see Table 2.7).
Analogies are often studied through application of focus to an interac-
tion between two problems. The known solution (e.g., that the user knows
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that a document can be stored digitally by means of a scanner) is called
the source problem, and the present situation (e.g., where the scanner is
unavailable) is the target problem for which a solution is needed. Research
has shown that a successful solution requires that the solver (i) recognise
the analogy between the source and the target problems and (ii) find a
mapping that aligns the features of the source and the target. Typically
the first stage is more difficult for solvers than the second stage (Gick and
Holyoak, 1980; see also Holyoak, 2005, p. 123).
Two forms of analogical problem-solving are now suggested to explain
repurposive appropriation. In being based on analogical representations,
they make use of the solver’s expert knowledge and, therefore, belong
among the strong problem-solving methods.
3.3.3 Analogical mapping through problem generalisation
The first suggested form of repurposive appropriation by analogy involves
two steps. First, the user represents the problem on a more general level.
This is followed by mapping to problem characteristics of a different solution
schema. For example, in the cookbook photograph example (see the quote
in Subsection 3.1.2), the respondent’s target problem was to store the list
of ingredients and the cooking instructions from an interesting recipe. The
successful solution was based on a repurposive appropriation of a camera
phone as a note-taking tool. In this discovery, the respondent may have first
represented the problem as a more general working schema, as a problem of
storing visual data. This may have been followed by another mapping, from
the general schema to another concrete solution schema. This is visualised
in Figure 3.5. User knowledge may play a part in the mapping’s second
stage, when the general schema is mapped to the candidate technologies:
the more alternative mappings the user can evaluate, the better the chances
of finding one that matches the requirements imposed by the problem.
This form of repurposive appropriation is suggested on conceptual
grounds. The existing data are not complete enough to support or refute
the hypothesis that users would appropriate by generating general problem
representations. Research into abstract problem schemas shows that this
form of analogical reasoning is usually difficult (Gick and Holyoak, 1983).
One reason for this is provided by the theories of situated cognition. Studies
suggest that recognising isomorphisms between solution representations is
difficult because humans represent problems in very concrete ways. Thus,
for a solver, problems that have a similarity on an abstract level are es-
sentially understood and perceived entirely differently (Kirsh, 2009). More






















Figure 3.5: Repurposive appropriation via mapping to another solution
schema through the problem’s generalisation (Sgen). The two missing sit-
uational features (F , in dashed circles) initiate the need to find another
solution schema.
research is needed to evaluate the hypothesis of mapping through generali-
sation and to estimate how often repurposive appropriation may take place
in that way.
3.3.4 Analogical mapping between tools
The other form of analogy-based repurposive appropriation is related to
analogies that are found between tools instead of representations of the
problem’s nature itself. That is, drawing again from the cookbook photo-
graph example (in Subsection 3.1.2), we find that, instead of establishing
an analogy with a more general task (such as ‘storing a recipe is like storing
any visual data’, as above), the analogy is related to tools in the problem-
solving task (‘the camera is like pen and paper’).
As was stated in the section introducing analogical problem-solving,
psychology has traditionally studied analogies at the level of problem repre-
sentations. However, in this case, an analogy applies between two or more
problem-solving tools. The analogical mapping is represented in Figure
3.6. It is established on the basis of the relationships among the tools’ con-
stituent elements. The greater the similarity is between the tools, the better
the tools may replace each other in the problem-solving task. Knowledge
plays an important role also in this form of repurposive appropriation. The
greater the basis the user has for comparing different tools to each other,
the better are his or her chances of discovering repurposive appropriations.
















Figure 3.6: Repurposive appropriation via substitution (see the curved
arrow labelled ‘mapping’) of a missing situational feature (F , in a dashed
circle) with an analogical feature that is available in the situation.
In the presentation of eight analogies between a digital camera and other
technologies, the repurposive appropriations studied in Paper 6 resemble
this form of analogical mapping. However, although the study showed
that such repurposive appropriations were common, it does not establish
decisively whether the discoveries were based on this kind of analogical
mapping. The previous two hypotheses for mapping (i.e., recognition of
solutions from the environment and analogical mapping through problem
generalisation), and perhaps also other forms of cognitive process, can be
used to explain the same outcomes. This too must be studied in future
research.
3.4 Existing knowledge
Figure 3.1 features existing knowledge as its topmost element. The impor-
tance of the user’s expertise, especially his or her understanding of tech-
nologies and tools, was mentioned multiple times in the previous sections.
This thesis applies a broad definition of expertise, denoting the quality
(e.g., breadth, depth, and accuracy) of the user’s knowledge. In this, it dif-
fers from another common definition, ‘reproducibly superior performance
on representative, authentic tasks’ (e.g., Ericsson, 2006, p. 688). Because
of its reference to reproducible performance, we do not use this definition.
Unlike task-specific expertise (e.g., violin playing; see Ericsson et al., 1993),
knowledge about technologies is means-oriented and applicable in different
domains. For example, the same knowledge of camera features (e.g., good
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ways of using a flash) may be applicable both to photo manipulation tasks
in advertising and to taking snapshots on social occasions. Task-specific
reproducible superior performance (in the example case, tuning the bright-
ness of the flash better than other users do in typical situations in which
flash photography is used) would not be a suitable measurable proxy for a
user’s ability to appropriate. The main reason is that repurposive appro-
priation is closer to novel rather than reproducible behaviour.
In the previous sections, repurposive appropriation through recognition
of structure from the environment (Subsection 3.3.1) was described as facili-
tated by the user’s knowledge of solution schemas and technologies, because
that provides a richer understanding of one’s environment and more entry
points for action. Also, both of the analogy-based repurposive appropri-
ation processes (subsections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4) were hypothesised to benefit
from knowledge, through increased possibilities for mappings either from
technologies to a generalised problem schema or between tools.
Therefore, the hypothesis that existing knowledge benefits repurposive
appropriation seems plausible also theoretically (as was discussed in the
previous sections), not only empirically (cf. Paper 6). The hypothesis of a
positive contribution was also one of the reasons for the judgement made
above that Gestalt psychology cannot satisfactorily explain repurposive ap-
propriation. In fact, psychological research has revealed that expertise usu-
ally increases creativity (see Weisberg, 2006b for a review). Experts differ
from novices in the manner in which their knowledge is organised. They
have a better memory of the problem’s details, and they employ different
strategies, have better and more elaborate problem representations, study
and redefine the problem tasks more often and longer than novices do,
and monitor their performance more carefully (cf. Chi, 2006; Eysenck and
Keane, 2000, p. 420; Zimmerman and Campillo, 2003).
Also, through practice, experts learn a large number of chunks – en-
coded patterns of information that can be manipulated in short-term mem-
ory and that are organised into individual relational structures (Chase and
Simon, 1973b, p. 56). Chunks help experts overcome the limitations of
working memory and notice critical properties of the problem they face.
Therefore, with the aid of chunks and better organisation of knowledge,
experts possess more situation-relevant information. This helps them rea-
son in a more flexible manner and determine the actions needed in the
situation (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995).
Instead of having a tendency to fixate users on existing solutions, the
two types of knowledge discussed in this chapter – solution schemas and
mental representations – improve users’ cognitive flexibility (Spiro et al.,
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1988). Cognitive flexibility increases the user’s ability to act successfully in
ill-defined domains (ibid.). Characterising the problem setting as ill-defined
seems to match those problems well that are solved with repurposive ap-
propriation. Accordingly, the more the user is aware of different solution
schemas, the more problems he or she can solve with the technology. Like-
wise, the more the user knows about the features of the technology, the
more ways he or she has of using the technology.
It is therefore possible that users whose expertise in technology use
is heterogeneous (e.g., acquired from different problem settings) also have
more cognitive flexibility and greater ability of repurposive appropriation
than others do. And, vice versa, gaining experience from only a few domains
may lead to knowledge structures that increase one’s fixation and weaken
ability to appropriate. These possibilities can be verified with further re-
search. Because the empirical studies for this thesis were based on novel
interactive applications (mGroup, CoMedia, and Comeks) and retrospec-
tive data (digital cameras), fixation on existing solution patterns remained
an unaddressed topic.
Studies of technology-oriented expertise have suggested that expert
users attempt to familiarise themselves with technology’s features more sys-
tematically than do novices. They also follow Web sites and other media
where the technologies are discussed, and through their extensive experi-
ence, they are aware of a large variety of ad hoc use situations (Oulasvirta
et al., 2011). However, while this probably makes experts superior to ordi-
nary users in terms of both the breadth and the depth of technology-related
information, most of the performance difference can be attributed to bet-
ter knowledge of the user interface (UI) features (ibid.). For example, in
situations in which the same task can be accomplished in multiple ways in
the UI, the experts are able to choose the methods that are most efficient
(Bhavnani and John, 2000).
UI-related knowledge may be important also in all three mapping pro-
cesses of repurposive appropriation. In the recognition of the ways in which
the environment’s structures can be mapped to a hypothetical problem
(Subsection 3.3.1), broad knowledge of the UIs helps the user see more
ways of manipulating the environment and making use of it in different
tasks. In the mapping from a generalised problem representation to differ-
ent technologies 3.3.3), UI knowledge helps the user consider more alter-
natives for concretising the generalised representation. Finally, in finding
how one technology can be replaced with another (Subsection 3.3.4), the
UI knowledge is of help in better considering the ways in which the inputs
and outputs of the unavailable technology can be replaced with another
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technology, one that offers different means of interacting with the environ-
ment. Despite these considerations, it appears less important to understand
how the various systems have been implemented technologically. Since UI
knowledge is closer to a surface-level than a deep understanding of the tech-
nology, this suggests that the breadth of knowledge may be more important
than the depth for repurposive appropriation. The latter has, in fact, been
suggested in one research paper (Mills and Chin, 2007), though one based
on general self-report data instead of naturalistic empirical evidence.
Within HCI research, user knowledge of UI features has been studied
through the hypothesis that knowledge is represented as mental models
in users’ memory. Technology-oriented mental models refer specifically to
what users know and believe about the system they use (Norman, 1988;
Payne, 2008). Studies of menu-based computer programs have suggested
that novice users learn mental models through label-following: they search
for a word in the UI that is identical to the name of the task they are
trying to perform, or related to it. With experience, they appear to deepen
their knowledge in an iterative manner (Engelbeck, 1986, cited in Rieman
and Young, 1996). To understand how the features of a system map to
effects in the external world, users may need to maintain not one but two
representations of the problem – the states of the external world that can
be manipulated and the states and operations in the technology – and a
mapping between the two (Payne et al., 1990).
However, mental models have been studied in quite constrained con-
texts, often in word processing or spreadsheet-related tasks. They have not
been considered for appropriation-like problems. For pursuit of research
in this area, the mental model theories will need to be extended so as to
describe how the situational features are used in interaction. One oppor-
tunity for this is found in Wright et al.’s DCog-based model of interaction
resources (2000). The model includes a classification of resources in the
environment that can guide the user during interaction. While this model
provides an opportunity for further theoretical work for explaining the three
mapping processes, this line of research was not pursued in this thesis. In-
stead, the research strategy desiderata emphasised field experiments and
realism.
3.5 From a model toward a theory
This chapter began with a model (Figure 3.1) of a repurposive appropria-
tion process in piecewise visual content creation. In itself, the model was
descriptive, but the individual sections of the chapter substantiated it by
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presenting three theoretical hypotheses for mapping-based repurposive ap-
propriation processes.
One of the definitions posited for the difference between a model and
a theory is that models are mostly descriptions of observed phenomena
(see Reese and Overton, 1970, on analogue models, p. 119) while theo-
ries are explanatory and predictive constructs that can be used to generate
hypotheses (p. 124). The hypotheses set forth in previous sections are con-
sistent with these characteristics, providing a coherent picture of different
cognitive structures that are important for repurposive appropriation and
how they interact with each other. The hypotheses can be summarised as
follows:
1. A user is able to appropriate a technology only to the extent that he
or she has acquired mental representations related to the features of
the technology (Subsection 3.1.1). Broad, surface-oriented knowledge
about technologies may support repurposive appropriation especially
(Section 3.4). A user who does not possess representations of the fea-
tures will not be able to map the other situational features to these
in any of the three types of mapping. This is because, without the
necessary representations, he or she will neither recognise partial so-
lution schemas in the environment’s structures (Subsection 3.3.1) nor
be able to find mappings between the technologies and the working
schema that contains his or her problem representation (Subsections
3.3.3 and 3.3.4).
2. In a corollary to the point above, because of the importance of
technology-related knowledge, weak problem-solving methods should
rarely result in repurposive appropriations. Similarly, perception of
affordances should rarely lead to repurposive appropriations in ICT
use, because the opportunities for interaction with most ICTs are
not directly perceivable (and therefore recognisable) without some
knowledge and interpretation.
3. Opportunities for repurposive appropriations can be discovered both
in the context of an immediate need for a solution and outside such
a situation (subsections 3.1.1 and 3.3.1). Of the two, repurposive
appropriation is more probable in the immediate situation, provided
that a technology is present that can serve as a solution. This is be-
cause the presence of this technology helps the user perceive a partial
solution schema for the problem (Subsection 3.3.1). However, the
presence of the technology helps only if the user has knowledge about
it, as was stated in the first item in this list.
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These hypotheses on mapping bring the outcomes of this thesis closer
to a theory of repurposive appropriation, particularly in the context of
piecewise visual content creation but possibly also more generally. The
following experimental designs can be used to evaluate the validity of the
three types of mapping described here:
• Recognition of structures in the environment: While the claim that
people appropriate by observing their environment is almost a truism
and cannot be easily subjected to testing, it is possible to investigate
the more precise claim that people pay attention to partial solution
schemas in their environment and discover novel purposes of use with
their help. If solution schemas support repurposive appropriation,
users with a certain schema should be more likely to discover a par-
ticular repurposive appropriation than other people are.
In a two-stage experiment design, participants could be divided into
an experimental group and a control group. All participants would
first be taught a number of solutions to ICT-related problems. These
solutions would not include repurposive appropriations of technology
but would endow users with solution schemas that would be relevant
in the second stage. Teaching for the experimental group would in-
clude some solutions that the other group would not hear. In the
second stage, participants in both groups would be asked to solve a
new problem with a set of tools that would be the same for all par-
ticipants. The tools would support problem-solving in multiple ways,
one of which would require a configuration that was taught only to
the experimental group in the first stage and that would be atypical
when compared to the other possible solutions. If that atypical so-
lution were to be selected more often within the experimental group,
this would increase the support for the hypothesis of partial-solution-
schema-based repurposive appropriation.
• Analogical mapping through problem abstraction: While research
(Cheng and Holyoak, 1985) suggests that people are able to, when in-
structed, benefit from generalised schemas at least when solving logic
problems (e.g., Wason’s selection task), it remains unclear whether
people construct and use abstract schemas spontaneously, without in-
struction. Research on everyday mathematics suggests that abstract
representations are rarely used (cf. Carraher et al., 1985; Lave, 1988;
Scribner, 1986). Before an attempt to prove that abstract schemas
are constructed and used spontaneously, it would be, as Cheng and
Holyoak (1985) also did, useful to show that such a mechanism is
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useful. Once a positive result has been seen, further studies could
attempt to invoke generalised schema creation without explicit in-
struction.
An experiment evaluating the benefit of generalisation could follow
Cheng and Holyoak’s research design, comparing the performance of
an experimental group with a control group in a repurposive appro-
priation task. The experimental group could be taught analogous
solutions that require repurposive appropriations before being pre-
sented with a repurposive appropriation task. A positive difference
in performance would suggest that generalised schemas can support
repurposive appropriation. That result would motivate their further
research.
• Analogical mapping between tools: The hypothesis that a user may
notice a similarity between two tools by applying analogical mapping
could be studied in a computer game environment. The participants
might play a series of puzzle games in which the most obviously suit-
able solution element would be removed in the middle of the series.
In all of the puzzles, other elements could be used as the removed ele-
ment’s replacement in a manner that could be discovered only through
an analogy. The hypothesis would be supported if the participants
started discovering this solution after the removal of the initially pre-
ferred element.
These experiments represent a number of technology usage domains,
in diverse areas, and are not explicitly within the piecewise visual content
creation scope. This may not be a problem, however. There is no reason
why human cognition would function differently in piecewise visual content
creation than in other domains that involve problem-solving and use of
tools. A broader scope would put the hypotheses to a more critical test.
The hypotheses presented in this chapter have implications both for




The task for this thesis was to develop a theoretical hypothesis as to the
cognitive processes in individuals’ workaround-like repurposive appropria-
tions (see Subsection 1.2.3). To address this, the previous chapter presented
a model (Figure 3.1) and three suggestions as to how repurposive appro-
priations take place through mapping processes (Section 3.3). The task
presented by the research question is considerable, however, so limitations
remain in the work that has been presented. The next section reviews these
limitations. The thesis concludes with implications of the findings for fu-
ture research on technology acceptance, human–computer interaction, and
studies in cognitive science.
4.1 Limitations
With no existing cognitively oriented theory on individual users’ repur-
posive appropriation processes to proceed from, this work adopted an ex-
ploratory research approach. To simplify the theory-building task, the em-
pirical studies addressed only piecewise visual content creation technologies,
and only a limited part of the larger phenomenon was selected for study.
The primary focus was on individual users’ repurposive workaround-like
appropriations of technologies that are not re-programmable (see Section
1.2). The influence of other users’ suggestions, discoveries of novel activities
with technology, gradually changing use processes, and technology modi-
fications were, therefore, defined to be outside the focus of the research.
In addition, the theoretical part of the work was focused on that part of
the perception–action cycle that describes how schemas direct users’ explo-
ration of their environment (see Figure 3.3). Addressing the full cycle would
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have covered also the processes with which users set out to verify their per-
ceptions through tools’ use and with which their technology-related mental
representations undergo changes.
The thesis began with a presentation of open-ended field experiments
and a synthesis of their findings, and the discussion concluded with a look
at three cognitive mapping processes. This process required two substan-
tial interpretive steps related to assumptions as to (i) the importance of
technological understanding and (ii) mapping-like processes as a basis for
repurposive appropriation. Both of these steps were derived mostly from
the Web survey study of digital cameras (Section 2.4 and Paper 6). Drawing
such inferences about mental contents or processes from Web survey data is
methodologically problematic. In the survey, the questions addressed prac-
tices by which respondents learn about the technological aspects of digital
photography (see Table 2.6, p. 57). In relation to step i, mental representa-
tions were cited as an important factor because high scores were associated
with high levels of repurposive appropriation. As for step ii, respondents’
open-ended qualitative descriptions of their repurposive appropriation sit-
uations appeared to be based on an underlying mapping-like process. The
findings related to both steps should be confirmed in future research with
experimental methods.
The two interpretive steps presented above are critical, because the
theory-building in Chapter 3 is dependent on their validity. This uncer-
tainty related to the theoretical inferences was, however, considered de-
liberately. Because a theory addressing the individual user’s repurposive
appropriation has been missing, the suggestions made in this thesis provide
a novel starting point for further research, critical evaluation, and attention
to design implications.
However, empirical evaluation of theoretical hypotheses is not the only
method for evaluating a research contribution. A study may contribute to
research also by clarifying poorly understood issues and exposing problem-
atic assumptions that previously had remained ignored. In addition, the
work can be of practical value. These contributions are presented in the
following sections.
4.2 Computational simulations
The ontological commitments of the previous chapter’s hypotheses can be
analysed critically through their comparison to recent computational mod-
els of human cognition. Given that such models have been developed to
simulate human cognitive processes to the best of current knowledge, the
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previous chapter’s hypotheses on the structure of solution schemas and the
mapping processes should not diverge radically from the premises of those
models.
The first of the three types of mapping – recognition of structure from
environment – resembles pattern recognition wherein the patterns consist
of perceptions of situational features. A pattern leads to a repurposive ap-
propriation if it reminds the user of a previous problem-solving situation in
which similar features were present. Reminding has been modelled in case-
based reasoning theories (Kolodner, 1993; Kolodner and Simpson, 1989) and
their predecessors (Schank, 1982). These theories and their simulations sug-
gest that humans reason on the basis of memories of previous experiences.
The experiences of similar situations are related to each other by their dif-
ferences from a prototypical experience. When a human processes a new
experience, the new experience serves as an index to the prototype in the
memory. This provides quick access to the nearest previous experience that
has a similar schema. Case-based reasoning can be applied to repurposive
appropriation by considering the incomplete solution schema as a pattern
that retrieves an experience of a situation from the user’s memory. Repur-
posive appropriation results if the retrieved memory amends the pattern
with a representation of a possible problem. This completes the pattern in
the form of a solution schema.
Another possibility would be a simulation based on template matching
(Gobet and Simon, 1996, 2000) in which the pattern recognition process
is based on a recursive hierarchical comparison of memory chunks (Feigen-
baum and Simon, 1984). The template theory suggests that competent
problem-solvers’ memories contain a large number of templates – schemas
with empty slots that can be filled with information. Chunks and templates
are stored within a ‘discrimination network’ that has the structure of a clas-
sification tree and simulates long-term memory. Template theory has been
developed into a simulation, called CHREST (for ‘Chunk Hierarchy and
Retrieval Structures’; Gobet and Simon, 2000), that predicts how chess
players reconstruct chess positions after brief presentations of the board.
CHREST has also been developed to simulate spontaneous recognition of
patterns (Gobet, 2005).
In terms of the structure of representations, both the template theory
and its predecessor, chunk theory (Chase and Simon, 1973a), provide sup-
port for the structure of solution schemas presented in this thesis. The
template theory presents two types of chunks – perceptual chunks and ac-
tion chunks – which can be associated with each other through production
links. Thus, when a person perceives a pattern of situational features, the
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recognition process identifies the chunks and templates that best represent
this pattern, and the result is used as an index to a solution representa-
tion (Lane et al., 2001, p. 893). However, the template theory simulations
published until now have operated in the visual perception domain, with
examples being chess board recall and electronic circuit diagram analysis.
This is a simpler domain than what repurposive appropriation involves, and
the model also assumes that perceptual and action chunks can be repre-
sented in a uniform manner. This assumption is unproblematic in, for ex-
ample, circuit diagram analysis, where perceptual chunks related to target
diagrams’ images can be treated also as action chunks in problem-solving
(Lane et al., 2000). However, in the case of repurposive appropriation, the
representations of perceptual chunks and action chunks will differ. This
leaves as an open question how to model the discovery of production links
between chunks of situational features and chunks of possible action se-
quences. Representing action sequences may require a formalisation other
than a discrimination network.
The second type of mapping – analogical mapping through problem
abstraction – requires a different kind of architecture, because it involves
comparison of two solution schemas with each other through an abstrac-
tion. Three simulations exist that do this. The Structure-Mapping Engine,
or SME (Markman and Gentner, 1993), searches for analogies between hier-
archically structured problem schemas by using local-to-global matching of
structural similarities. Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction, or
ACME (Holyoak and Thagard, 1989), is additionally able to find analogies
in the presence of also other than purely structural constraints. Finally,
LISA, standing for ‘Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies’
(Hummel and Holyoak, 2003), is a symbolic–connectionistic model that also
takes into account the constraints of working memory and is based on a
neural architecture.
The third type of mapping – analogical mapping between tools – resem-
bles relational mapping and constraint satisfaction in that the user needs to
find a new representation to replace another representation in an otherwise
complete solution schema. This requires alignment of new representation
with the existing relations (and, thereby, constraints) of the schema. The
same simulations as above – SME, ACME, and LISA – appear to be suitable
for this task. The assumptions made about mental representations in LISA
are centred on the question of finding a way to implement symbolic repre-
sentations on a neural basis. Beyond that, LISA is able to model any set
of representations that can be expressed as propositions. Because solution
schemas can be expressed as propositional networks (see Subsection 3.1.2),
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LISA permits the representational assumptions adopted in this thesis but
does not specify them further. In terms of simulations of repurposive ap-
propriation, there appear to be no theoretical reasons for not using LISA
if the size of the propositional network is increased to the level of the two
types of mapping addressed in the previous chapter. Such attempts have
not been published yet, however.
Analogical problem-solving has been modelled also by means of
the Adaptive Control of Thought–Rational (ACT-R) production system
(Salvucci and Anderson, 2001). However, that model cannot evaluate mul-
tiple simultaneous relations between the two schemas and can be led astray
easily by superficial similarities (Lovett and Anderson, 2005, p. 410).
In summary, one can tentatively state that it seems possible to model re-
purposive appropriation computationally with the existing computational
models for cognition. This means that repurposive appropriation – al-
though it is a creative process involving a large amount of interaction with
the situation – may be explained as an ordinary cognitive process.
4.3 Repurposive appropriation and acceptance
Studying repurposive appropriation helps one recognise that a system’s
success cannot be measured with a single variable only. Instead, the same
system may be useful in different ways in different situations and with
different users. This claim is in interesting conflict with the studies in
IS research that have focused on technology ‘acceptance’. Typically this
variable has been operationalised as extent of usage, either as use frequency
or as use duration (for reviews, see Lee et al., 2003; Schwarz and Chin,
2007). The main predicting variables have been the perceived ease of use
and the perceived usefulness (e.g., Davis, 1989; Davis et al., 1989). In
more recent studies, also antecedent predictors and moderating variables
have been introduced (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). The best technology
acceptance model to date has been claimed to predict as much as 53%
of the usage variance and 69% of use intentions (Venkatesh et al., 2003).
With such high levels of explanation, TAMs have been lauded as empirically
robust models and have therefore become one of the most widely applied
theoretical frameworks within IS research (Lee et al., 2003).
However, this thesis has provided evidence that casts doubt on the va-
lidity of many TAM-based research findings. Reasons for this have been
presented in Paper 5. Most importantly, TAM-based research has not ac-
knowledged the variety of use purposes for which technologies actually are
used. Paper 6 indicates that, on average, 48% of camera users have used
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their camera(s) for atypical purposes at least once. Acceptance studies
within IS have largely omitted such uses from their research models, even
if they appear to be quite common.
Most users apply the same technology for different purposes at different
times, and users also differ from each other (see Orlikowski, 1992b, 1996;
Majchrzak et al., 2000; Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994; Lassila and Brancheau,
1999; Paper 5 and Subsection 1.1.6). These findings suggest that, instead
of a single-measure approach as adopted in TAM studies, the starting point
should be to acknowledge that users’ judgements of perceived usefulness are
based on very different orientations in different situations. The same argu-
ment applies to the perceived ease of use. The dominant line of thinking
has until now been the opposite, with an assumption that all use can be
measured in a uniform manner.
In some studies, discrepancies arising from simplistic definition of the
dependent variable have already been observed. For example, some stud-
ies of Web acceptance have suggested that a new predictor – perceived
enjoyment – is more important than perceived usefulness is (van der Hei-
jden, 2004), while other studies have pointed toward the opposite result –
that perceived usefulness is the strongest predictor of Web acceptance (e.g.,
Cheung et al., 2000). A likely reason for the discrepancy is that authors
have treated the Web as a technology differently: as a means for enjoyment
(van der Heijden) or as a utility tool (Cheung et al.). They have not val-
idated their assumptions as to the Web’s hedonistic vs. utilitarian nature
with users, instead postulating these by themselves. Subsequently, they
have recruited participants from different directions: from a film hobbyists’
Web site (van der Heijden) and from a university notice board (Cheung
et al.). As a result, the studies have probably investigated two different
kinds of phenomena. Yet the authors in question have not made this ex-
plicit. In fact, they instead have generalised their findings to cover all uses
of the Web, thereby producing conflicting results.
The high R2 values present a puzzle. If the dependent variable is defined
in an insensitive manner, without acknowledgement of the varying purposes
of use, it should introduce unexplained variance in the model and lead to
low explanatory power. However, even though the variety among diverse
purposes of use has not been included in TAMs, the findings have consis-
tently shown high R2 values (as seen also in the study of Web acceptance).
There are at least two tentative explanations for this.
First, it may be that the technologies studied have been so constrained
in their use that successful predictions result, by necessity, from the contex-
tual constraints. In other words, the policies and practices in the organisa-
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tions and communities studied may have been so strict that the technologies
were used only in the ways expected by the researchers, thereby removing
the additional variance. In their review of 22 TAM studies, Legris et al.
(2003) stated that most studies have examined office automation software
(e.g., spreadsheets, mailers, and word processors) or systems development
applications (e.g., programming tools). The review does not reveal how
strictly the technologies’ use had been prescribed in the 22 organisations.
Accordingly, whether the high R2 values are a result of homogenous use
practices in these contexts remains unproven.
Second, the relationship between the independent variables (perceived
usefulness and perceived ease of use) and the dependent variables (intention
to use and actual use) may be a truism. It appears typical in TAM studies
to define both the dependent and independent variables very broadly. For
example, perceived usefulness can be measured with statements such as
‘my job would be difficult to perform without electronic mail’ and ‘using
electronic mail improves my job performance’ (Davis, 1989, p. 324). These
statements do not specify the manners or purposes in which the technology
is used. Paper 5 notes that, upon seeing such statements, the respondents
can interpret them through their own intentions of use or actual ways of
use. Active users and respondents with positive use intentions are likely to
give higher ratings for such statements. This means that the correlations
between the dependent and independent variables are likely to be strong
in most cases. A negative correlation (e.g., low acceptance but high usage)
is likely only when a technology use is enforced while its use is, in fact,
complicating the work. The other possible reason for a negative correlation
– high acceptance but low usage – would apply only in organisations that
hinder people from using tools that they have provided to workers. Such a
situation is very rare. Thus, the odds of high R2 values are likely to be high
with any technology1. The problem with this possibility is that the inde-
pendent and dependent variables mean different things for each respondent.
This means that the model cannot be used as a guide for development of
more accepted technologies. It will be unclear how to improve usefulness
and ease of use if their meaning differs from one user to the next.
However, more critical evaluation of TAMs and empirical research on
repurposive appropriation in an organisational context is needed if we are
to explain the conflict between the TAM-based findings and the predictions
related to heterogeneity that follow from studies of repurposive appropria-
tion.
1In inspiration for this reasoning, I am indebted to a remark of my supervisor Antti
Oulasvirta on circular logic in TAM research.
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4.4 Repurposive appropriation by an individual
in a social context
The theoretical focus of this thesis has been on the individual user, leaving
much of the user’s social context unaddressed. In reality, however, people
are always embedded in a social context, and this can be expected to have
a strong effect on their knowledge, thinking, and ways of perceiving and
interpreting events and situational features. More extensive consideration
of the social context therefore will provide multiple ways of extending the
theory-oriented hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. The follow-
ing paragraphs suggest two starting points for such extensions.
First, this thesis suggests that the user’s existing knowledge is impor-
tant in repurposive appropriation and that this knowledge is represented
with mental representations of situational features and solutions. What is
not addressed in the previous chapter is the question of how the user has
learnt the mental representations that constitute his or her existing knowl-
edge. A significant amount of human knowledge is learned from others
(e.g., Tomasello, 1999; D’Andrade, 1995; Wegner, 1986). In the situation
in which the user appropriates, even when acting alone, he or she will
therefore make use of knowledge that has social origins. One question of
relevance for this thesis is whether the knowledge that has been arrived at
via others is different from knowledge gained by the individual alone when
used as a basis for repurposive appropriation. For better understanding of
this question, research would be needed for investigating the processes of
how knowledge, especially technology-related knowledge, is obtained.
Second, users not only learn from others but also can act as sources of
knowledge. Solution schemas, by being mental representations of technol-
ogy use, can be propagated to other users through teaching, demonstra-
tion, or passive observation on the part of the learner. In the framework
of the proposed theoretical hypotheses, spreading of a repurposive appro-
priation can be understood as propagation of the corresponding solution
schema among users. This parallels the conceptions within DCog, which
sees co-operative activities as propagation and computation of represen-
tational states (Hutchins, 1995a). Propagation of solution schemas is a
process in which the mediators have been found to play an important role
(see Subsection 1.1.3). Each user, upon learning about another user’s re-
purposive appropriation, makes interpretations related to that use. The
solution schema may change as it propagates in the user community. This
conceptualisation may provide a means of combining the hypotheses pro-
4.4. Repurposive appropriation by an individual in a social context 107
posed here with the theories and empirical evidence on social aspects of
repurposive appropriation.
When the models and the theory development from Section 2.5 onward
are compared to the socially oriented studies reviewed in Chapter 1, it is
important to notice that the interpretations of the term ‘appropriation’
differ across different research domains. The conclusions and propositions
– focusing on repurposive appropriations and individuals – made in this
thesis can be used to complement the findings from the other domains.
The unique starting points for theory development in this thesis – those of
mental representations and situated problem-solving – are not in a theoret-
ical conflict with the socially oriented approaches, save for one domain. In
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, many researchers are scepti-
cal of applying any mentally-framed concepts to analysis of activity. This
conviction stems from a devotion to base findings only for such matters
as can be observed directly in naturally occurring interaction (e.g., Potter
and te Molder, 2005). Among the authors whose works are mentioned in
Subsection 1.1.2, Button et al. reject theories based on mental represen-
tations, Suchman has some reservations as to representations’ explanatory
value, and Brown and Perry do not appear to take a stance on this issue.
Also, Papers 3and 4in this thesis applied the concept of ‘resource for ac-
tion’ from the ethnomethodological framework without a conflict arising
with the ontological status of mental representations.
Integrating the outcomes of this thesis and those of socially oriented
studies into a larger framework of repurposive appropriation requires bridg-
ing that has not been attempted in this study. One element in need of
further work involves co-discovery. Repurposive appropriations can also be
co-discovered by a group of people acting in the same situation. In this
case, the co-present people do not simply provide suggestions (as classified
in Table 2.2) but may contribute significantly to the discovery as equal part-
ners. Such situations may require different theoretical models than the ones
presented in this thesis. In particular, the theoretical hypotheses regarding
mapping and partial solution schemas (which are easiest to understand as
the individual user’s cognitive processes and knowledge) may need to be
extended. Another element requiring further research is the sharing that
takes place after a piece of content has been created (see the step labelled
‘sharing’ in the situated content creation model in Figure 2.8). When a
piece of content is shared with others and repurposive appropriations have
played a part in the creation of that content, different receivers of the con-
tent will pay attention to the novel parts of the content to differing extents
and in different ways. The resulting changes in technology use practices
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may vary a lot and lead to further conversions, which currently are poorly
understood. Finally, future research should also attempt to investigate
gradual processes in which novel purposes of use may be discovered with-
out distinct events of mapping or other insights. Muller et al. (2005) have
maintained that shared technological resources develop in a piecemeal fash-
ion. Whether mappings play a role also in gradual appropriation processes
requires further research.
4.5 Supporting repurposive appropriation in HCI
Part of the research agenda in HCI is to increase knowledge of how to de-
sign better technologies. Research into repurposive appropriation supports
designing technologies that can be useful in more than one way. The most
straightforward design implications presented in the literature so far (e.g.,
Dix, 2007; see Subsection 1.1.1) have been largely based on a common-
sense understanding of good design without empirical or theoretical back-
ing. This thesis substantiates such implications in the following ways, where
the terms in brackets are from (Dix, 2007):
1. Technological features should be easily observable (i.e., ‘provide visi-
bility’). Doing this will help the users better recognise technological
features that are relevant to their present goals and map them to
their working and solution schemas. Good observability also helps
users recognise entirely new solution schemas. An example of good
observability is the small mirror located next to the camera lens of
an Ericsson mobile phone. This helped one of the respondents in
the Web-based survey study to recognise the possibility of using the
mobile phone camera as a mirror (see Table 2.7, on p. 60). Had
the mirror not been there, the respondent may not have noticed this
opportunity.
2. Connectivity with other technologies (i.e., ‘plugability and configura-
tion’) makes a technology more easily appropriable. In the manner
described above, also connectivity increases the number of ways in
which users can map the features of the technology to other features
of the environment and their schemas. For example, modern mobile
phones have an extensive set of wired and wireless ways in which
they can exchange digital content with other systems. Phones typi-
cally afford easy sharing of content from the phone to other systems
but inform much less (except for music and videos, for which many
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phones have dedicated software) about the option of serving as me-
dia storage for other systems’ digital content. As another example,
content-editing systems should provide multiple import and export
options in order to support connectivity (see also Twidale and Jones,
2005, for examples of using copy-and-paste features in different work
flows). Provision of such connectivity alternatives would increase the
likelihood of mappings between tools and solutions.
3. Technology should be responsive and allow exploration (i.e., ‘support
not control’). Immediacy and interactiveness encourage the user to
engage in move-testing experiments (cf. Subsection 3.1.2, p. 80).
Being able to manipulate the technology and the content helps users
notice more mappings with the environment and also find analogues
from their memories. The mobile comic-strip creator Comeks was
an example of this. Its UI allowed direct manipulation (cf. Hutchins
et al., 1985) of visual content. While the absence of a point for com-
parison means that this cannot be proved, the exploratory story-
telling messages may have been a result of the ability to explore with
the content-editing features.
The theoretical hypotheses also point to the following novel design im-
plications related to the important role of mental representations in repur-
posive appropriation.
1. Breadth of technological knowledge may be more important for re-
purposive appropriation than depth is. In stark contrast, the previ-
ous literature (e.g., Norman, 1988) has maintained that the system’s
design must help the user develop a correct mental model of the sys-
tem’s internal operation. This has emphasised the importance of
depth-oriented technology understanding.
The emphasis on breadth turns the focus toward (i) the discoveries
that the user can make from the UI and (ii) the solution schemas that
the user can learn from interaction. To increase the breadth of the
user’s knowledge, the UI could proactively (Salovaara and Oulasvirta,
2004) remind of alternative actions that one can perform with the
system. The alternatives suggested could be reminders based on the
user’s past actions or mention actions that he or she has not tried yet.
However, because suggestions may become a distracting experience
for the user if taken to an extreme, the feature probably should be
used only at particular points in the interaction – e.g., when the user
searches for help via a keyword-based search.
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2. Technology should be made easy to interpret. This suggestion is in
opposition with some previous papers on repurposive appropriation
(e.g., Gaver et al., 2003; Höök, 2006; Sengers and Gaver, 2006), which
recommend ambiguity as a means of supporting novel interpretations.
The present work, in contrast, advocates design that helps users de-
velop solution schemas based on interpretations of concrete effects of
technology’s features. One way to support this is to let users preview
the effects of different actions without changing the actual content.
A feature of this sort is already in use in image editors, where the
effects of various filters can be tested on a preview image. This could
be applied more generally in computer programs through provision
of previews within the top-level drop-down menus. This would help
users increase their awareness of a program’s various features.
3. Design should support both old and new ways of use. The model in
Figure 3.1 shows solution schemas as co-existing in human memory.
In other words, when a user discovers a new solution schema through
repurposive appropriation, the new schema will not have negative ef-
fects on the existing solution schemas. Even when the newly learned
creative uses are more effective than the old ones, the user will not
forget the old uses or abandon their application. Instead, the user
may use the system in both the old and new ways as he or she deems
appropriate. Existing research on repurposive appropriation has not
addressed this phenomenon, although it has implications for system
design. In particular, customisable and user-programmable technolo-
gies should not be designed in such a way that new adaptations disable
old uses. Designers should be careful if they intend to allow or force
removal of old features when new ones are added.
As a final note, Paper 6 indicated that a significant proportion of users
are capable of appropriating technology. This capacity should be brought
into better use by increasing users’ awareness of opportunities to appro-
priate. Design should promote ‘open-minded use’: a mindset that would
direct users to ‘stay open to (new) interpretations’ (Sengers and Gaver,
2006). Seemingly extraneous situational factors are easily filtered out from
users’ attention. Systems should help users to overcome this limitation.
For example, sometimes content creation becomes easier if its tasks are
carried out by means of two different systems. However, the user may not
recognise this possibility. In this situation, the individual editing programs
could better inform as to which methods they can provide for information
exchange between each other. Another application of this idea is the no-
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tifications that computers often display if they discover a trusted nearby
mobile device that can act as a wireless modem, data storage, or a mes-
saging gateway. These notifications help users become better aware of the
possibilities of the surrounding technology ecology.
Repurposive appropriation is a positive phenomenon in practically all
technology use. Appropriability increases systems’ usefulness and helps
users solve problems that they have not encountered before. By supporting
this, it increases both user efficiency and enjoyment. A significant propor-
tion of modern life is related to the use of various technologies. If these
technologies support natural repurposing and allow frictionless adaptation
for a wide range of purposes, our day-to-day life is improved. Repurposive
appropriation is, therefore, at the core of good design and deserves more
attention from design and research.
4.6 Implications for research and theories on cog-
nition
Repurposive appropriation as a phenomenon involves many challenging fea-
tures for research into cognition. It is self-directed, creative, dependent on
expertise, and something that takes place in the user’s technology-mediated
interaction with the environment. These features lead to challenges in
achieving sufficient experimental control and reducibility to independent
phenomena that can be studied rigorously.
This thesis has suggested a way in which repurposive appropriation
may be theorised about through cognitive constructs and hypotheses that
can be subjected to more in-depth scrutiny. On the basis of the empirical
work and the hypotheses that were developed in the previous chapter, the
present work suggests three implications for cognitive science:
1. The role of technology-related knowledge should be better under-
stood. The thesis suggests that this understanding plays an important
role in repurposive appropriation. Furthermore, it suggests that this
applies especially for breadth-oriented knowledge. These hypotheses
would need empirical verification. Ideally, this should include inves-
tigation of the dimensions of technological knowledge (e.g., breadth,
depth, and accuracy) in general.
2. Solution schemas should be better understood. This thesis assigns
them an important role in repurposive appropriation, both in the ex-
ecution of actions and in the recognition of problem-solving solutions
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in the environment. However, it does not make suggestions as to their
exact structure. It is only hypothesised that they contain two parts:
a mapping of situational features that are relevant in a solution and
a description of actions to be performed on these features.
3. Research should pay more attention to creative use of problem-solving
operators, such as the cognitive and physical tools that are used in
the course of a search for a solution. The operations that solvers
choose to carry out are heavily dependent on the representations of
the available tools. Despite the importance of tool-related knowl-
edge, researchers for the most part have studied how the problem
representations for the entire problem are changed before a successful
solution can be found. In contrast, repurposive appropriation draws
attention to operator creativity – creative use of operators (i.e., tools)
that solvers decide to use in their path toward the solution. Opera-
tor creativity can change the solution schema of any problem, even
a routine one, by restructuring the prototypical sequence of actions
needed for reaching the goal. Therefore, studying problem-solving
operators may have relevance far beyond the scope of repurposive
appropriation.
As is stated in the first chapter, appropriability is a general quality
factor that applies to practically any technology. This thesis has provided
viable hypotheses for a theory of repurposive appropriation by grounding
its hypotheses empirically in field experiments and surveys in HCI and
theoretically in cognitive science and psychology. Further research on re-
purposive appropriation and application of the findings within the HCI field
may have a significant effect on daily problem-solving and living.
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ogy: Vernacular Science and Social Power, pages vii–xxi. University of Min-
nesota Press, Minneapolis, MN.
Engelbeck, G. E. (1986). Exceptions to generalizations: Implications for formal
models of human–computer interaction. Master’s thesis, Department of Psy-
chology, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.
Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by Expanding. An Activity-Theoretical Approach
to Developmental Research. Orienta-Konsultit, Helsinki.
Ericsson, K. A. (2006). The influence of experience and deliberate practice on
the development of superior expert performance. In Ericsson, K. A., Charness,
N., Feltovich, P. J., and Hoffman, R. R., editors, The Cambridge Handbook
118 References
of Expertise and Expert Performance, chapter 38, pages 685–705. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Ericsson, K. A. and Kintsch, W. (1995). Long-term working memory. Psychological
Review, 102(2):211–245.
Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., and Tesch-Römer, C. (1993). The role of delib-
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MacLean, A., Carter, K., Lövstrand, L., and Moran, T. (1990). User-tailorable
systems: Pressing the issues with Buttons. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Con-
ference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI’90), pages 175–182,
New York, NY. ACM Press.
Majchrzak, A., Rice, R. E., Malhotra, A., King, N., and Ba, S. (2000). Technology
adaptation: The case of a computer-supported inter-organizational virtual team.
MIS Quarterly, 24(5):569–600.
References 123
Markman, A. B. and Gentner, D. (1993). Structural alignment during similarity
comparisons. Cognitive Psychology, 25(4):431–467.
Martin, D. and Sommerville, I. (2004). Patterns of cooperative interaction: Link-
ing ethnomethodolgy and design. ACM Transactions on Computer–Human In-
teraction, 11(1):59–89.
McGrath, J. E. (1981). Dilemmatics: The study of research choices and dilemmas.
American Behavioral Scientist, 25(2):179–210.
McNamara, T. P. (1994). Knowledge representation. In Sternberg, R. J., editor,
Thinking and Problem Solving, chapter 3, pages 81–117. Academic Press, San
Diego, CA.
Mills, A. and Chin, W. (2007). Conceptualizing creative use: An examination of
the construct and its determinants. In Proceedings of Americas Conference on
Information Systems (AMCIS 2007).
Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In Winston, P. H.,
editor, The Psychology of Computer Vision, pages 211–281. McGraw-Hill, New
York, NY.
Mørch, A. (1997). Three levels of end-user tailoring: Customization, integration,
and extension. In Kyng, M. and Mathiassen, L., editors, Computers and Design
in Context, chapter 3, pages 51–77. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Mørch, A. and Mehandjiev, N. D. (2000). Tailoring as collaboration: The mediat-
ing role of multiple representations and application units. Computer Supported
Cooperative Work, 9(1):75–100.
Muller, M. J., Minassian, S. O., Geyer, W., Millen, D. R., Brownholtz, E., and
Wilcox, E. (2005). Studying appropriation in activity-centric collaboration.
International Reports on Socio-Informatics, 2(2):63–71.
Nambisan, S., Agarwal, R., and Tanniru, M. (1999). Organizational mecha-
nisms for enhancing user innovation in information technology. MIS Quarterly,
23(5):365–395.
Nardi, B. A. (1993). A Small Matter of Programming: Perspectives on End User
Computing. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and Reality: Princpiples and Implications of Cogni-
tive Psychology. W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, CA.
Newell, A. (1980). Physical symbol systems. Cognitive Science, 4(2):135–183.
Newell, A. and Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
124 References
Newell, A. and Simon, H. A. (1976). Computer science as empirical inquiry:
Symbols and search. Communications of the ACM, 19(3):113–126.
Nisbett, R. E. and Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal
reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3):231–259.
Norman, D. A. (1988). The Psychology of Everyday Things. Basic Books, New
York, NY.
Norman, D. A. (1999). The Invisible Computer: Why Good Products Can Fail,
the Personal Computer Is So Complex, and Information Appliances Are the
Solution. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Novick, L. R. and Bassok, M. (2005). Problem solving. In Holyoak, K. J. and
Morrison, R. G., editors, The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning,
chapter 14, pages 321–349. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Ohlsson, S. (1992). Information-processing explanations of insight and related
phenomena. In Keane, M. T. and Gilhooly, K. J., editors, Advances in the
Psycholoy of Thinking, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1–44. Harvester Wheatsheaf,
New York, NY.
Orlikowski, W. J. (1992a). The duality of technology: Rethinking the concept of
technology in organizations. Organization Science, 3(3):398–427.
Orlikowski, W. J. (1992b). Learning from Notes: Organizational issues in group-
ware implementation. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer
Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW’92), pages 362–369, New York, NY. ACM
Press.
Orlikowski, W. J. (1996). Improvising organizational transformation over time: A
situated change perspective. Information Systems Research, 7(1):63–92.
Orlikowski, W. J. (2000). Using technology and constituting structures: A practice
lens for studying technology in organizations. Organization Science, 11(4):404–
428.
Oulasvirta, A., Wahlström, M., and Ericsson, K. A. (2011). What does it mean to
be good at using a mobile device? An investigation of three levels of experience
and skill. International Journal of Human–Computer Studies, 69(3):155–169.
Paavola, S. (2006). On the Origin of Ideas: An Abductivist Approach of Discovery.
PhD thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland.
Paivio, A. (1990). Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach. Oxford
University Press, New York, NY.
Payne, S. J. (2008). Mental models in human–computer interaction. In Sears, A.
and Jacko, J. J., editors, The Human–Computer Interaction Handbook: Fun-
damentals, Evolving Techniques, and Emerging Applications, chapter 3, pages
63–76. Lawrence Erlbaum, New York, NY, 2 edition.
References 125
Payne, S. J., Squibb, H. R., and Howes, A. (1990). The nature of device mod-
els: The yoked state space hypothesis and some experiments with text editors.
Human–Computer Interaction, 5(4):415–444.
Peirce, C. S. (1902). Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, volume 5 of Collected
papers. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Perry, M. and Rachovides, D. (2007). Entertaining situated messaging at home.
Computer Supported Cooperative Work, 16(1–2):99–128.
Petersen, M. G., Madsen, K. H., and Kjær, A. (2002). The usability of ev-
eryday technology-emerging and fading opportunities. ACM Transactions on
Computer-Human Interaction, 9(2):74–105.
Pinch, T. J. and Bijker, W. E. (1987). The social construction of facts and artifacts:
Or how the sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit
each other. In Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P., and Pinch, T., editors, The Social
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and
History of Technology, pages 17–50. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Pipek, V. (2005). From Tailoring to Appropriation Support: Negotiating Group-
ware Usage. PhD thesis, Faculty of Science, Department of Information Science,
University of Oulu, Finland, Oulu.
Potter, J. and te Molder, H. (2005). Talking cognition: Mapping and making the
terrain. In te Molder, H. and Potter, J., editors, Conversation and Cognition,
chapter 1, pages 1–54. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Raaijmakers, J. G. W. and Siffrin, R. M. (1981). Search of associative memory.
Psychological Review, 88(2):93–134.
Raento, M., Oulasvirta, A., Petit, R., and Toivonen, H. (2005). ContextPhone:
A prototyping platform for context-aware mobile applications. IEEE Pervasive
Computing, 4(2):51–59.
Reese, H. W. and Overton, W. F. (1970). Models of development and theories
of development. In Goulet, L. R. and Baltes, P. B., editors, Life-Span Devel-
opmental Psychology, chapter 5, pages 115–145. Academic Press, New York,
NY.
Rieman, J. and Young, R. M. (1996). A dual-space model of iteratively deepen-
ing exploratory learning. International Journal of Human–Computer Studies,
44(6):743–775.
Robbins, P. and Aydede, M. (2009). A short primer on situated cognition. In
Robbins, P. and Aydede, M., editors, The Cambridge Handbook of Situated
Cognition, chapter 1, pages 3–10. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
126 References
Rodon, J., Sese, F., and Christiaanse, E. (2011). Exploring users’ appropriation
and post-implementation managerial intervention in the context of industry
IOIS. Information Systems Journal, 21(3):223–248.
Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of Innovations. Free Press, New York, NY, 4
edition.
Rogers, Y. (1993). Coordinating computer-mediated work. Computer Supported
Cooperative Work, 1(4):295–315.
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